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NEVER HANGING DEFENDANTS OUT TO 
DRY:  PRESERVING THE POLICY BEHIND THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MONEY 
LAUNDERING CONSPIRACIES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Combating money laundering through legislation cuts the Achilles‘ 
heel of criminal schemes that profit from it and stops its detrimental 
consequences on society from spreading.1  Money laundering has 
become the focus of crime prevention efforts in the United States and 
elsewhere due to its effects on criminal activity and legitimate financial 
transactions.2  Although money laundering was strictly a matter for 
regulatory agencies in the 1970s, in 1983 President Ronald Reagan called 
for a commission on organized crime to investigate ―the sources and 
amounts of organized crime‘s income, and the uses to which organized 
crime puts its income.‖3  Since then, money laundering has become the 
subject of legislation, culminating in 1986 with Congress passing the 
Money Laundering Control Act (―the MLCA‖).4 
The MLCA empowered the government to investigate money 
laundering schemes by criminalizing financial transactions that conceal 
                                                 
1 See GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING:  A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MODEL 84–85 (2000) (writing that because money laundering funds criminal schemes, 
typically found in organized crime, fighting the techniques used to fund those schemes 
directly undermines crime ―by taking away the incentive for [those criminal] activities‖). 
2 Id.  Stessens provides three reasons why governments combat money laundering:  (1) 
to prevent criminals from profiting off their activities; (2) to gather paper trails left by high-
level criminals and kingpins in more complicated schemes; (3) to reduce the detrimental 
influence that the flow of dirty money obtained from unlawful activities has on the 
financial system.  Id. at 85–86. 
3 Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (July 28, 1983).  See HEBA SHAMS, LEGAL 
GLOBALIZATION:  MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND OTHER CASES 17–21 (2004) (summarizing 
federal legislation in the 1970s imposing record-keeping and reporting requirements for 
banks and other financial institutions).  Congress first passed the Bank Secrecy Act (―BSA‖) 
in 1970 in reaction to increasing criminal exploitation of relaxed financial record-keeping 
practices.  Id. at 18.  The BSA required banks to keep copies of certain financial instruments 
involved in a transaction, such as checks, and imposed civil and criminal penalties for 
failure to retain designated records.  Id. at 18–19.  Additionally, the BSA mandated that 
banks report domestic transactions that exceed $10,000 in value and international 
transactions that exceed $5,000 in value, and that citizens and residents conducting 
business within the United States report any existing relationship with foreign financial 
institutions.  Id. at 19.  Shams concluded that the statute was pivotal in the development of 
anti-money laundering law because its responses to problems in criminal, fiscal, and 
regulatory enforcement formed the basis for the current money laundering regime.  Id. at 
21. 
4 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 
3218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2006)). 
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the presence of funds that are taken from illegal activities and are used to 
fund future illegal activities.5  Congress drafted the MLCA to give 
prosecutors broad reach to prosecute activities suspected of concealing 
funds used to finance illegal activities.6  As a result, the government 
prosecutes both large international drug cartels and terrorist 
organizations and small two-person operations for money laundering.7 
While this widely applicable statute can serve to defeat the money 
laundering problem, it potentially overrides other policy interests, such 
as barring money laundering prosecutions based on stale evidence.8  As 
the primary statute for such prosecutions, the MLCA depends on other 
statutes to bar prosecutions that lack sufficient evidence to allege money 
laundering.9  Nevertheless, the complexity of money laundering crimes 
implies that prosecutors have an unlimited amount of time to bring an 
indictment for conspiracy to launder money.10 
This Note proposes amendments to the MLCA that preserve a 
defendant‘s interest in having a conspiracy prosecution based on 
evidence proving the existence of a money laundering conspiracy long 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Tracy Tucker Mann, Money Laundering, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 769, 771 (2007). 
7 Id. at 772; cf. Ellen Jancko-Baken, When Will the Idling Statute of Limitations Start 
Running in RICO Conspiracy Cases?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2167, 2178–79 (1989) (stating that 
because Congress did not define organized crime in the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt 
Organization (―RICO‖) statutes, there is ongoing debate about whether the statutes apply 
to strictly illegal entities or if they also apply to legal entities where RICO conspiracies may 
occur).  Courts have more often than not read RICO to include illegal and legal entities.  Id. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
397 (2009) (upholding a conviction for money laundering on the grounds that defendant 
co-conspirators committed actions after satisfying the objectives of their scheme which 
renewed the limitation period permitted by statute). 
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (stating that it is an offense to conspire to defraud or commit 
an offense against the United States, an allegation included in money laundering 
indictments); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (setting out a five-year limitation period for non-
capital criminal offenses subject to federal law, including money laundering crimes under 
the MLCA); 26 U.S.C. § 6531(5) (2006) (establishing a six-year limitation period for tax 
evasion offenses that some money launderers use to conceal funds). 
10 See Mann, supra note 6, at 772 (―[The MLCA] also makes the subsequent use of 
criminal proceeds in any transaction illegal in perpetuity, extending well beyond the 
statute of limitations for the original criminal conduct.‖).  A similar dilemma appears in 
prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Cf. Michael A. Doyle & Michael P. Kenny, 
The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Criminal Enforcement of the Sherman Act:  Restraint of 
Trade or Enjoyment of the Spoils?, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 184 (1986) (discussing how the 
Supreme Court has held that an antitrust conspiracy may continue beyond the initial 
agreement, but that the Court ―has not clearly ruled when an antitrust conspiracy ends‖).  
This demonstrates, Doyle and Kenny state, ―an inherent tension in the law‖ between the 
purpose of statutes of limitations to bring finality to an offense and the conspiracy doctrine 
―extend[ing] the statute beyond its stated term.‖  Id. 
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after the actual conspiracy to launder money has ended.11  First, Part II 
places this Note in context, introducing the federal money laundering 
statute and its relationship to other statutes commonly applied in a 
money laundering prosecution including statutes on conspiracy, tax 
evasion, and limitations for certain offenses.12  Second, Part III analyzes 
the interaction between the statutes of limitations and the substantive 
offenses for money laundering, which create conflict in application that 
risks the statute of limitations having no practical enforcement under 
some money laundering crimes.13  Finally, Part IV proposes model 
amendments to the MLCA, the conspiracy statute, and the statute of 
limitations frequently applied in money laundering prosecutions in 
order to increase the effectiveness of statutory limitation periods.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Part II explains the relationship between money laundering and the 
federal statute of limitations.15  Notably, the MLCA abrogates the 
policies underlying the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.16  
                                                 
11 See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA and relevant statutes). 
12 See infra Part II.A.1 (providing background on the federal money laundering statute); 
infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the federal statute on tax evasion); infra Part II.A.3 (discussing 
the federal statute on conspiracy); infra Part II.B.1 (giving an overview of the policy 
considerations behind statutes of limitations and judicial rules that influence how and 
when limitation periods apply); infra Part II.B.2 (introducing the federal statute of 
limitations for non-capital criminal offenses and the federal limitation period for tax 
evasion). 
13 See infra Part III.A (discussing how the MLCA may expose defendants to the danger 
that an act remotely connected to the conspiracy may defeat a claim that the limitation 
period expired prior to an indictment); infra Part III.B (elaborating on the divergence from 
the Supreme Court‘s strict standard for connecting overt acts and conspiratorial 
agreements); infra Part III.C (analyzing how alleging tax evasion is enough to defeat a 
limitation period under a loose interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence 
standard); infra Part III.D (discussing rules favoring limitation periods under certain 
circumstances and judicial rules on overt acts as alternative methods for determining the 
application of a limitation period). 
14 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a model provision that establishes a limitation period 
solely for money laundering indictments within the MLCA); infra Part IV.B (recommending 
a model amendment to the MLCA that codifies the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence 
standard for money laundering prosecutions); infra Part IV.C (creating a model provision 
that allows indictments for conspiracy under the MLCA with the purpose of preventing 
prosecutions under the federal conspiracy statute and preventing application of the general 
statute of limitations). 
15 See infra Part II (introducing the crime of money laundering through its applicable 
federal statute and its relationship to the federal general statute of limitations, particularly 
through the lens of conspiracy and tax evasion as joint offenses in a money laundering 
indictment). 
16 See infra Part III (discussing how the interactions between the money laundering 
statute, the federal statute of limitations, and the federal conspiracy statute have revealed 
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Part II.A discusses the MLCA, Congressional intent for the statute, and 
the advantages it gives prosecutors, including the opportunity to pursue 
prosecutions for conspiracy and tax evasion.17  Part II.B examines 
policies behind statutes of limitations in general, the judicial approach to 
limitations, Congressional adoption of such policies into the federal 
limitation period, and the weakening effect on criminal statutes of 
limitations caused by treating money laundering as a substantive 
crime.18 
A. Transactional Money Laundering Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and § 1957 
Congress enacted the MLCA to prevent money laundering because it 
is a source of funding for criminal ventures, such as drug trafficking or 
terrorism.19  This Section will first discuss the statutes criminalizing 
money laundering through financial transactions, focusing on the 
meaning of each element of the crime.20  Next, this Section will introduce 
the federal tax evasion statute, which comes into play because tax 
evasion is a common form of concealing funds in a money laundering 
scheme.21  Finally, this Section will cover the federal general conspiracy 
statute, its elements, and its relationship to the money laundering 
statutes.22  The relationship between these statutes suggests that 
Congress intended to allow prosecutors the most amount of freedom 
available to prosecute a money laundering scheme.23 
                                                                                                             
weaknesses in each when prosecutors bring an indictment for a money laundering 
conspiracy). 
17 See infra Part II.A (discussing the federal money laundering, tax evasion, and 
conspiracy statutes). 
18 See infra Part II.B (explaining that statutes of limitations are legislative instruments 
designed to balance the interests of prosecutors, defendants, and courts, and then 
discussing how courts in general use the statutes of limitations to either bar or allow an 
action against a defendant before introducing the federal general and tax code statutes of 
limitations). 
19 See Amos N. Guiora & Brian J. Field, Using and Abusing the Financial Markets:  Money 
Laundering as the Achilles‟ Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 59, 63–64 (2007) (describing 
government responses to terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime through 
implementation of anti-money laundering statutes). 
20 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the federal money laundering statutes, the elements 
constituting money laundering, and how interpretation of those elements favors 
prosecution of money laundering crimes). 
21 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing how money launderers have used tax evasion as a 
form of concealment in money laundering schemes, and how the federal tax evasion statute 
relates to the money laundering statutes). 
22 See infra Part II.A.3 (introducing the federal general conspiracy statute, its elements, 
and its relationship to the money laundering statutes). 
23 See Peter J. Kacarab, An Indepth Analysis of the New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON 
TAX J. 1, 2 (1991) (―The new money laundering statutes are aimed to hurt the criminal, with 
the greatest impact, by hitting the criminal in his pocketbook.‖). 
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1. The Money Laundering Control Act 
Money laundering is a statutory crime subject to legislative policy.24  
The MLCA criminalizes money laundering and establishes a penalty for 
conspiracy to launder funds.25  Section 1956(a)(1) of Title 18 of the United 
States Code states that a financial transaction of proceeds originating 
from illegal activity constitutes an act of money laundering and is 
punishable with a fine, imprisonment, or both.26  The statute separates 
                                                 
24 SHAMS, supra note 3, at 45.  Sophisticated case studies on transactional laundering 
schemes and professional launderers guided the policy behind the MLCA.  Id. at 49.  Its 
drafters, however, wrote the law to cover all possible laundering methods because 
laundering methods do not conform to clear and unitary definitions.  Id.  As a result, the 
MLCA can apply in cases radically different from the law‘s initial concerns.  Id. 
25 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2006).  The penalty for conspiring to launder funds is 
determined by the act that substantiates the transaction concealing the money.  See id. 
§ 1956(c) (listing transactions that Congress defined as an activity that can launder illegally 
derived funds); id. § 1956(h) (stating that the penalty for conspiracy to launder money 
depends on the nature of the transaction).  For a congressionally recognized definition of 
money laundering, see Business Community‟s Compliance With Federal Money Laundering 
Statutes:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st 
Cong. 142 (1990) (statement of Michael J. Murphy, Senior Deputy Comm‘r, IRS), which 
defines money laundering as ―concealment of the existence, nature or illegal source of illicit 
funds in such a manner that the funds will appear legitimate if discovered.‖ 
26 United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
because money laundering is a specific intent crime, the prosecution must prove that the 
defendant specifically intended to defraud and launder proceeds knowing they were 
obtained through unlawful activity).  The court in Rahseparian found that evidence was 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that a defendant specifically intended to defraud when 
promising an inflated monetary reward in exchange for mailing to him a registration fee 
for a phony contest.  Id.  Transactional money laundering is defined in relevant part as 
follows: 
(a)(1)  Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, 
conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in 
fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— 
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity; or 
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or 
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— 
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity; or 
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal 
law, 
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the 
value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, 
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.  For 
purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall be considered 
to be one involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity if it is 
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the crime of money laundering into the following four elements:  
knowledge, intent, specified unlawful activity, and concealment.27 
The statute‘s legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to 
prevent money laundering to reduce funds available for criminal 
activities.28  Congress also extended the statute‘s application in 
prosecutions to include several white-collar crimes.29  In general, the 
scope of money laundering is bound only to financial transactions that 
either further criminal activity or attempt to conceal its presence.30 
                                                                                                             
part of a set of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of which 
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and all of which 
are part of a single plan or arrangement. 
§ 1956(a)(1). 
27 See § 1956(a) (listing the elements of money laundering); Rahseparian, 231 F.3d at 1272 
(stating that in order to prove guilt for money laundering under § 1956, the prosecution 
must prove ―(1) [the defendant] knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2) he knew 
the funds represented proceeds of an unlawful activity; (3) the funds actually did represent 
the proceeds of the unlawful activity; and (4) the transaction was designed to conceal the 
nature, location, source ownership or control of the proceeds‖). 
28 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 394 
(2003).  Cuéllar gives three concerns of legislators underlying the statute against money 
laundering: 
(1) a recurring preoccupation with the nexus linking high-level figures 
in drug trafficking and organized crime to money laundering; (2) a 
conclusion that money laundering involved a range of financial 
activity, including complex financial schemes, that—if detected—could 
point to the presence of predicate crimes (and, more recently, to the 
presence of terrorism); and (3) . . . a concern with people thought to be 
specialists in money laundering, navigating the criminal underworld 
and helping people engage in illicit transactions. 
Id. at 396.  Statements from the executive branch also affect the interpretation of legislative 
intent.  Id.  The executive‘s interpretation of money laundering includes criminal 
organizations and professional laundering, which suggests that ―money laundering is the 
‗life blood‘ of crime and the fight against money laundering is about shattering the link 
between money and crime.‖  Id. 
29 Id. at 401–02 (stating that the scope of unlawful activities in § 1956 has since included 
environmental crimes, murder-for-hire, and terrorism).  See generally § 1956(c)(7) (providing 
a long list of specified unlawful activities that the statute considers predicates for money 
laundering, including manufacturing, selling, or distributing controlled substances; 
murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, arson, and crimes of violence; fraud or attempt to 
defraud related to a foreign bank; acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise as 
defined in the Controlled Substances Act; and crimes of violence at airports, espionage, 
firearms trafficking, and terrorism). 
30 Patricia T. Morgan, Money Laundering, the Internal Revenue Service, and Enforcement 
Priorities, 43 FLA. L. REV. 939, 947 (1991).  Morgan notes that § 1956, unlike previous 
legislation, criminalizes money laundering of monetary instruments, not just currency.  Id. 
at 948.  Thus, the statute makes it significantly easier to prosecute anyone who received 
payment of any kind originating in unlawful activity, provided he knew or strongly 
suspected of its origin.  Id. at 948–49. 
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Congress also debated the knowledge requirement and suggested 
that certain knowledge is required in transactions that involve illegal 
funds.31  Defendants, however, will meet the knowledge requirement 
without actual knowledge of an illegal activity if they know that the 
proceeds will go toward illegal activity.32  A defendant only needs to 
know that someone else intended to design the transaction.33 
The next element, conducting a financial transaction, comprises 
several actions involving banks or disposition of property.34  To satisfy 
this element, the transaction must either (1) move funds or monetary 
instruments, or (2) use a financial institution, the result of which affects 
interstate or foreign commerce in some way.35  Congress broadly defined 
                                                 
31 See § 1956(c)(1) (defining the knowledge requirement as ―the person knew the 
property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not 
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign 
law‖); see also S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 9–10 (1986) (evaluating the need for a knowledge 
requirement in the MLCA).  With regard to the knowledge requirement, the Senate report 
states: 
Section 1956(a)(1) . . . employs a scienter standard of ―knowing,‖ rather 
than ―reason to know‖ or ―reckless disregard.‖  In fact, it has two 
―knowing‖ requirements. In order to prove a violation of the offense, 
the Government must show not only that the defendant knew the 
property involved in a transaction was the proceeds of crime, but also 
that the defendant either intended to facilitate a crime or knew that the 
transaction was designed to conceal the proceeds of a crime. 
Id. at 9–10.  The Senate report adds that willful blindness satisfies the knowledge 
requirement.  Id. 
32 Morgan, supra note 30, at 948.  The knowledge requirement is still satisfied ―[i]f the 
defendant knew only that the property was derived from unlawful activity, but did not 
know the nature of the activity or whether it was one of the specified crimes, and the 
activity is a specified crime.‖  Id. 
33 See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (criminalizing activity with intent to engage in tax fraud and tax 
evasion); id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (criminalizing activity with the intent to conceal or disguise 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity); G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering:  The Crime of 
the „90s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 162 (1989) (stating that under § 1956(a)(1)(B) a defendant 
need only know ―that the transaction is designed in whole or in part,‖ and that the use of 
the passive voice means the intent requirement is met when the defendant knew ―the 
intent of the person who ‗designed‘ the transaction‖); see also JOHN MADINGER, MONEY 
LAUNDERING:  A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS 40 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that under 
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) the government only needs to prove a defendant intended to promote an 
activity that he knew was illegal).  Evidence for proving intent under either provision may 
be either direct or circumstantial.  Id. at 41. 
34 See § 1956(c)(3) (defining a transaction as a common transaction such as a purchase, 
sale, or transfer; or any transaction concerning a bank such as a loan, deposit, or 
withdrawal).  Similarly, the MLCA defines financial transactions as any transaction 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or using a financial institution that in turn affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Id. § 1956(c)(4). 
35 TAX DIV., DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 25.02 [4] (2001), 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/25ctax.htm#25.02[4]; see also 
§ 1956(c)(6) (stating that the definition of financial institution for purposes of the MLCA 
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who can be involved in a money laundering scheme and the duration of 
the crime itself.36 
Congress, however, did not clearly define what constitutes proceeds 
derived from an unlawful activity in a transaction, which has resulted in 
vague interpretations that are advantageous to both prosecutors and 
defendants.37  In part, this uncertainty stems from the requirement that 
the proceeds emerge from specified unlawful activities that § 1956(c)(7) 
lists.38  The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the meaning of 
proceeds, but critics argue that the Court‘s efforts have confused the 
meaning even more.39  Furthermore, the statute does not require 
prosecutors to trace the proceeds back to a particular illegal act, only that 
the proceeds originated from a § 1956(c)(7) activity.40  The proceeds do 
not have to be purely illegal or a result of a specified unlawful act.41 
                                                                                                             
also includes what is provided in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2006), which defines financial 
institution as any one of twenty-six entities or persons involved in financing). 
36 See Kacarab, supra note 23, at 7 (stating that the statute applies to anyone who 
participated in a financial transaction and knew that the proceeds of the transaction came 
from an illegal activity).  In terms of duration, the reference to attempted conduct in the 
statute makes this an inchoate crime.  Id. 
37 Guiora & Field, supra note 19, at 70.  Although focusing on the prosecution of 
terrorism, the authors suggest that because the statute lacks a definition of proceeds, 
litigants can use this flexibility in the statute to their advantage.  Id.  In addition, the 
statute‘s lack of guidance in proving the source of the proceeds gives prosecutors latitude 
because they only need to prove that the proceeds trace back to some unlawful activity.  Id.  
Despite the vagueness of the statute‘s definition of proceeds, courts have held that the 
provision remains constitutional because it still puts defendants on notice.  See United 
States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031, 1034–35 (D. Nev. 1989) (stating that the provision in 
§ 1956 imposing criminal penalties on avoiding a transaction reporting requirement is not 
vague because ―[t]here is nothing in the legislative history [demonstrating] that Congress 
intended that the word ‗avoid‘‖ to mean anything other than its common definition); 
United States v. Mainieri, 691 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that individuals 
who engage in financial transactions meant to conceal illegally obtained money are put on 
notice by the statute‘s wording). 
38 See § 1956(c)(7) (listing what constitutes a specified unlawful activity for purposes of a 
money laundering prosecution).  Interestingly, tax crimes are not included as among 
specified unlawful activities.  S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 11–12 (1986) (concluding that tax 
evasion should not be a specified unlawful activity because it is a nonreporting of proceeds 
derived from specified unlawful activities and does not produce identifiable proceeds by 
itself). 
39 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 520 (2008) (holding that proceeds under 
§ 1956 only means funds derived from a specified unlawful activity, not funds derived 
from the commission of such activity).  See generally Jimmy Gurulé, Does “Proceeds” Really 
Mean “Net Profits”?  The Supreme Court‟s Efforts to Diminish the Utility of the Federal Money 
Laundering Statute, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 339, 339–43 (2008) (commenting on the Supreme 
Court‘s recent decision regarding the definition of proceeds and objecting to the decision as 
diminishing the effect of the MLCA while appealing to Congress to clarify the meaning of 
proceeds in the statute). 
40 United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990).  In Blackman, the 
government introduced evidence that the defendant funded his narcotics trafficking 
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Section 1956(a)(1)(B) implies that a successful conviction for money 
laundering turns on the concealment of proceeds of the unlawful 
activity.42  While courts have interpreted concealment to encompass all 
transactions designed to launder proceeds from specified unlawful 
activity, courts have also stated that only unlawful activities specified in 
§ 1956(c)(7) constitute acts of concealment.43  Sufficient proof of 
                                                                                                             
scheme through a money wiring service and by transferring title on his truck.  Id. at 1253–
54.  The defendant appealed, arguing that a reasonable juror would not find that the 
government‘s evidence proved the money wiring and transfer of title on his truck 
contained proceeds from drug trafficking.  Id. at 1256.  The defendant contended that the 
transfer of title was not a financial transaction and that the MLCA requires the government 
to trace the proceeds involved in the transaction to a particular drug sale.  Id. at 1256–57.  
The court concluded that the transfer of title fit within the definition of financial transaction 
because it involved a monetary instrument.  Id. at 1257; see also S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 12–13 
(stating that § 1956(c)(3) defines financial transaction broadly).  The court also concluded 
that the government met its burden of proof by showing that the defendant wired money 
as a way to launder money for his drug trafficking scheme.  Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257.  The 
court reasoned that § 1956 did not require direct evidence to prove the proceeds element.  
Id.  The court further reasoned that the government can prove that transactions involve 
proceeds from drug trafficking through circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence is 
sufficient.  Id. 
41 See United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 40 (7th Cir. 1991) (―[W]e cannot believe that 
Congress intended that participants in unlawful activities could prevent their own 
convictions under the money laundering statute simply by commingling funds derived 
from both ‗specified unlawful activities‘ and other activities.‖).  The court of appeals added 
that ―commingling [of funds] is itself suggestive of a design to hide the source of ill-gotten 
gains.‖  Id. 
42 § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i).  For examples of intent to conceal assets gained from unlawful 
activity, see United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 2001), using a third party to 
disguise the real owner of the assets; United States v. Omoruyi 260 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 
2001), using a false name for a bank account to deposit and withdraw proceeds from to 
disguise the identity of the real owner; United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 
2001), structuring cash transactions to disguise the nature of the illegal funds; United States 
v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000), using property registered or titled to a third 
party with whom the defendant has a close relationship; United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 
740, 748 (6th Cir. 2000), using convoluted transactions transferring proceeds to a third party 
who converted the money to cash and transferred the proceeds back to the defendant; and 
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841, commingling funds obtained through illegal activity into the bank 
account of a legitimate business.  For other examples of evidence, see also United States v. 
Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1176 (11th Cir. 2005), suggesting intent to conceal assets through 
unusual secrecy during the transaction; United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 490 (4th Cir. 
2003), setting up a sham or fictitious business to store assets; and United States v. Esterman, 
324 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2003), making statements from defendants or making unusual 
financial moves demonstrate an intent to conceal.  Expert testimony may also expose 
concealment of illegal proceeds by providing insight into criminal practices.  Magluta, 418 
F.3d at 1176. 
43 See United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2006) (―It is true that the money 
laundering statute does not criminalize the mere spending or investing of illegally obtained 
assets.‖); United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005) (―[W]e construe the 
money laundering statute as a ‗concealment statute—not a spending statute.‘‖).  The 
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concealment must include substantial evidence of a design to conceal 
rather than merely suspicious acts by defendants.44  The simplicity of the 
alleged scheme will likely not support a conclusion that a defendant 
attempted to conceal assets of illegal activities.45 
Section 1957, on the other hand, is the companion to § 1956 and 
criminalizes engaging in a money transaction involving property worth 
over $10,000 received from a specified unlawful activity.46  Congress 
enacted § 1957 and recognized that non-financial transactions, such as 
commercial transactions, can conceal assets.47  Although this statute 
                                                                                                             
Shepard court stated that a transaction of illegally obtained money alone does not constitute 
concealment.  See id. (―We reject an interpretation of the money laundering statute ‗to 
broadly encompass all transactions, however ordinary on their face, which involve the 
proceeds of unlawful activity.‘‖).  The court justified its reasoning on the expressed 
language of the money laundering statute, which required actions intending concealment.  
Id.; see also § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (containing language courts have interpreted as limiting the 
scope of concealment). 
44 Shepard, 396 F.3d at 1121.  The defendant in Shepard attempted to disguise funds from 
an unlawful activity by depositing them in his daughter‘s bank account and the bank 
account of a kennel club.  Id. at 1118.  The court in Shepard found that depositing assets into 
a third party‘s bank account was concealment because the defendant attempted to 
commingle the unlawfully obtained money with the money from the legitimate business or 
legitimate owner of the account.  Id. at 1122. 
45 Esterman, 324 F.3d at 572.  The court in Esterman observed that concealment in a 
money laundering scheme included ―the existence of more than one transaction, coupled 
with either direct evidence of intent to conceal or sufficiently complex transactions that 
such an intent could be inferred.‖  Id. at 572.  ―In contrast, the cases in which money 
laundering charges have not succeeded are typically simple transactions that can be 
followed with relative ease, or transactions that involve nothing but the initial crime.‖  Id. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  The relevant section provides in part: 
(a)  Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), 
knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is 
derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b). 
(b)(1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an 
offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States Code, 
or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both. 
(2)  The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under 
paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally 
derived property involved in the transaction. 
(c)  In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government 
is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from 
which the criminally derived property was derived was specified 
unlawful activity. 
Id. 
47 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 15 (1986) (―This branch of the offense has been created in 
recognition that money laundering schemes need not involve financial institutions and 
that, in fact, non-financial transactions are extensively used as parts of money laundering 
schemes.‖). 
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relates to § 1956, it bears some differences, namely the absence of a 
―knowledge of specified unlawful activity‖ requirement.48  The 
legislative record suggests, however, that § 1957 should be read broadly 
to allow the prosecution of commercial acts.49  The language of § 1956 
and § 1957, therefore, gives prosecutors freedom to prosecute anyone 
associated with a money laundering scheme in order to effectuate 
Congress‘s intent to prevent such a scheme altogether.50 
2. Tax Evasion as a Form of Concealment 
Congress later drafted provisions into the MLCA that allow 
prosecutions under other criminal statutes for acts that allegedly 
concealed funds, such as tax evasion.51  Money launderers have been 
known to use tax evasion as an effective tactic to conceal funds received 
from illegal activity because there are no identifiable proceeds.52  
                                                 
48 Compare § 1957(a) (stating that a defendant must know he is involved in a transaction 
but not that the transaction involves criminally derived property), with id. § 1956(a) (stating 
that a defendant must know the transaction involved funds representing proceeds from 
unlawful activity).  It is unclear whether § 1957 requires the prosecutor to trace the funds if 
they commingle with legitimate funds.  Mann, supra note 6, at 780–81. 
49 § 1957(d) (providing that a transaction done within the maritime or territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States or outside the jurisdiction of the United States and by a 
United States citizen is subject to prosecution); Mann, supra note 6, at 775 (―Congress 
intended to dissuade people from engaging in even ordinary commercial transactions with 
people suspected to be involved in criminal activity.‖).  Representative Dan Lungren made 
a statement regarding the necessity for a broad knowledge requirement:  ―It is time for us 
to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, ‗If you know that person is a trafficker and has 
this income derived from the offense, you better beware of dealing with that person.‘‖  
H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 14 (1986). 
50 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 14 (statement of Sen. Bill McCollum) (stating that if a 
grocer observed a potential customer peddling drugs and taking cash before walking into 
the store, the grocer should be held accountable if he accepted the cash from the trafficker 
in exchange for groceries). 
51 See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (including as criminal conduct a transaction of proceeds 
of specified unlawful activity with intent to violate the tax evasion statute in the Internal 
Revenue Code); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (2006) (criminalizing attempts to evade tax or make 
false statements on a tax return). 
52 See Kacarab, supra note 23, at 22–23.  Kacarab states that § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) was 
amended to prevent money launderers from using a loophole in the definition of proceeds 
in the MLCA: 
The loophole was that § 1956 prohibited transactions which were 
designed to conceal the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.  
However, proof of intent to conceal the underlying specified unlawful 
activity is essential to obtain a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  The 
big problem is that even if the drug dealer actually did intend to 
conceal his illicit source of income, proof of such intent may be 
impossible to obtain.  Keep in mind that § 1956 as originally enacted 
required the government, at a minimum, to prove a defendant‘s 
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Congress‘s response to this method of concealment was the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, which allowed prosecution of § 1956 money 
laundering with tax evasion under § 7201 and § 7206 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.53 
Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, also known as Title 26 of 
the United States Code, makes it a felony to willfully evade or attempt to 
willfully evade or fail to pay a federal tax.54  Section 7206 of the Internal 
                                                                                                             
knowledge that funds represent the ―proceeds of some form of 
unlawful activity.‖  However, tax crimes, such as tax evasion (26 
U.S.C. § 7201) or filing of a false return (26 U.S.C. § 7206), unlike other 
crimes, have no identifiable ―proceeds.‖  Therefore, the government is 
unable to use the originally enacted § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) to prosecute 
individuals who launder illegal proceeds for the purpose of tax 
evasion. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  In addition, tax evasion is not considered a specified unlawful 
activity because the MLCA only covers unlawfully obtained money, which by its nature is 
non-taxable.  MADINGER, supra note 33, at 41. 
53 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6471, 102 Stat. 4181, 4378 (1988).  
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act modified the MLCA, making it a crime to commit or attempt to 
commit a financial transaction of illegal funds by way of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 
or making a false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) 
(making it a crime to commit acts in violation of the tax evasion or false tax return statutes 
under the Internal Revenue Code).  Senator Joseph Biden noted the necessity of modifying 
the contemporaneous statute to include tax crimes as a form of money laundering activity, 
stating that under the amendment, ―any person who conducts a financial transaction that 
in whole or in part involves property derived from unlawful activity, intending to engage 
in conduct that constitutes a violation of the tax laws, would be guilty of a money 
laundering offense.‖  134 CONG. REC. 32,699 (1988).  Because the nature of 
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) involves a tax crime, prosecutors must seek authorization from the Tax 
Division of the Justice Department in order to indict.  U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-105.750 (1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/105mcrm.htm.  
Such authorization is required when an indictment involves a tax-fraud conspiracy or 
when intent to commit tax evasion or filing false returns is the sole purpose of the financial 
transaction.  Id.  Authorization from the tax division is not always required, however, as 
the U.S. Attorney‘s Manual submits three conditions where this is not necessary to proceed 
on a money laundering indictment: 
It is assumed in situations where Tax Division authorization is not 
requested that:  (1) the principal purpose of the financial transaction 
was to accomplish some other covered purpose, such as carrying on 
some specified unlawful activity like drug trafficking; (2) the 
circumstances do not warrant the filing of substantive tax or tax fraud 
conspiracy charges; and (3) the existence of a secondary tax evasion or 
false return motivation for the transaction is one that is readily 
apparent from the nature of the money laundering transaction itself. 
Id. 
54 26 U.S.C. § 7201.  The statute states: 
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition 
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon 
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Revenue Code acts as a corollary to the tax evasion statute and defines 
tax evasion as withholding, falsifying, or destroying records.55  
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow prosecutors to 
join tax evasion with non-tax related offenses under certain guidelines.56  
Under the amended § 1956, prosecutors may find a violation if a 
defendant made a financial transaction with intent to engage in tax 
evasion or false filing of tax returns.57  Defendants may use tax evasion 
as part of a complex money laundering scheme that, due to its 
                                                                                                             
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in 
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both, together with the costs of prosecution. 
Id. 
55 Id. § 7206(5)(B).  The section states: 
Any person who— 
 . . . . 
(5) [i]n connection with any compromise under section 7122, or offer 
of such compromise, or in connection with any closing agreement 
under section 7121, or offer to enter into any such agreement, 
willfully— 
 . . . . 
(B) [r]eceives, withholds, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies any 
book, document, or record, or makes any false statement, 
relating to the estate or financial condition of the taxpayer or 
other person liable in respect of the tax; 
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined 
not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or 
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of 
prosecution. 
Id. (statutory numbering system omitted). 
56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).  Rule 8(a), concerning joinder of offenses, provides that: 
The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate 
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged—whether 
felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of the same or similar 
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected 
with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 
Id. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii); TAX DIV., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL 
§ 25.03[2] (2008) [hereinafter 2008 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/tax/ 
readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20Chapter%2025.htm.  The manual states that the statute, at 
the very least, requires only the act and intent to constitute a violation.  Id.  Furthermore, 
§ 1956 applies to evasion of income, gift, excise, estate, or any other tax.  Id. § 25.03[2][a].  
Section 7201 does not require that a defendant successfully evade tax obligations, only that 
tax evasion was willfully attempted.  Cf. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 49899 (1943) 
(stating that including an attempt element in the contemporary tax evasion statute 
indicated that Congress wanted to distinguish between neglectful and motivated failure to 
pay taxes).  Thus, there is also an imposed knowledge requirement.  Cheek v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991) (holding that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant 
knew the transaction was for the purpose of circumventing tax obligations). 
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sophistication, would involve multiple persons conspiring to commit 
money laundering.58 
3. Conspiracy 
Similarly, conspiracy crimes frequently occur in money laundering 
schemes because their complicated nature requires multiple participants 
and gives prosecutors discretion on how to prosecute.59  This section 
explains the federal criminal conspiracy statute (―§ 371‖), the MLCA 
provision for conspiracy (―§ 1956(h)‖), the four elements of conspiracy, 
and conspiracy‘s relationship to money laundering schemes.60  
Conspiracy under § 371 is a conspiracy to commit an offense against or 
defraud the United States and is charged as a separate offense from the 
substantive crime that the conspirators contemplated.61  Section 1956(h) 
                                                 
58 See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING:  A MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE PROFESSIONS AND 
OTHER DESIGNATED BUSINESSES 65 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that defendants may use tax 
evasion ―as a smokescreen for their unusual or abnormal transactions or instructions‖); see 
also § 6471, 102 Stat. at 4378 (modifying the MLCA to include tax evasion as money 
laundering activity); Kacarab, supra note 23, at 22 (stating that Congress intended the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to bring in third party money launderers under the scope of the 
MLCA).  The MLCA does not specifically criminalize tax evasion included in money 
laundering, only the transactions involved in evading taxes.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii); 
Mann, supra note 6, at 774 n.35. 
59 J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 31 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that 
the complexity of white-collar crimes, which often involve multiple actors, allows the 
government to add a conspiracy charge).  Strader gives three reasons that account for the 
frequent charging of conspiracy in white-collar crimes: 
First, as is often true with crimes charged in the white collar context, 
the boundaries of conspiracy are inherently uncertain . . . . Second, 
because of this vagueness and expansiveness, the government can 
often use conspiracy both to criminalize conduct that otherwise would 
not be subject to prosecution and to gain increased penalties for minor 
crimes.  Finally, given the amorphous nature of the crime, it provides 
prosecutors with an enormous amount of discretion in deciding when, 
and when not, to bring a criminal case.  For these reasons, and because 
of the tremendous strategic and tactical advantages it provides the 
government, conspiracy is a controversial crime. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  The MLCA contains its own provision for indicting money 
laundering conspiracies, imposing the same penalty for conspiracy as on the substantive 
offense.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 
60 See infra Part II.A.3 (introducing the federal criminal conspiracy statute and its 
relationship to the MLCA and the MLCA conspiracy provision). 
61 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).  This section provides in part: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against 
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency 
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more the such 
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
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does not consider conspiracy to be an offense separate from money 
laundering and sets the penalty for conspiracy to commit a money 
laundering offense.62  Two clauses in § 371, the fraud and offense clauses, 
provide justification for charging a defendant with conspiracy.63  The 
statute defines an offense against the United States as a violation of a 
statute.64  Similarly, it defines fraud as preventing a lawful function of 
government and does not require an injury to the government as a result 
of the fraudulent act.65  The elements for conspiracy under both § 371 
                                                                                                             
Id.; see also Christian Davis & Eric Waters, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
523, 523–24 (2007).  Davis and Waters state that criminal statutes may have their own 
conspiracy provisions, but that this does not preclude prosecutors from attaching an 
indictment under the general conspiracy statute.  Id. at 524-25.  Section 371 makes an 
exception for the maximum punishment for conspiracy if the underlying offense is a 
misdemeanor.  18 U.S.C. § 371.  If the underlying offense is a misdemeanor, the 
punishment for conspiracy will not exceed the maximum punishment for the offense.  Id.  
Section 371 is a modern version of the original federal conspiracy act that Congress passed 
in 1866, making it illegal for government distillery inspectors to conspire with distillery 
owners to avoid paying taxes.  Terry D. Aronoff, Acts of Concealment and the Continuation of 
a Conspiracy, 17 GA. L. REV. 539, 539–40 (1983); see also Law of May 17, 1879, ch. 5440, 21 
Stat. 4 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)) (criminalizing a conspiracy of two or more 
persons to defraud or commit an offense against the United States, including any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy).  Although Congress has since expanded the scope of the 
conspiracy statute, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to view conspiracy too broadly.  
Aronoff, supra note 61, at 540; see also, e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 
(1957) (―[W]e will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-
sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.‖). 
62 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (―Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this 
section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.‖). 
63 Id. § 371 (stating that a defendant can be charged with conspiracy only when he 
conspired with one or more other persons to commit any offense against the United States 
or to defraud the United States). 
64 Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding 
conviction of defendants for conspiracy to violate a federal criminal statute).  In Galardi, a 
defendant was charged with conspiracy, under § 371, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which 
prohibited transporting stolen money orders in foreign commerce.  Id. at 1074; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 2314 (imposing fines or imprisonment for transport of stolen goods, money, or 
securities in foreign or interstate commerce).  The court rejected the government‘s charge of 
conspiracy to commit that violation.  Galardi, 476 F.2d at 1079.  The court reasoned that 
because the statute did not apply to money orders altered before the defendant transported 
them, and the defendant succeeded in proving they altered the money orders before they 
transported them, they did not commit a violation of that statute.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2314 (―This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or 
spurious representation of an obligation or other security of the United States.‖).  Thus, the 
court held that there was no offense for which the prosecutors could charge the defendant 
with conspiracy.  Galardi, 476 F.2d at 1079. 
65 United States v. Notch, 939 F.2d 895, 901 (10th Cir. 1991) (defining fraud as keeping 
the government from performing a lawful function).  In Notch, the defendant argued that a 
charge of conspiracy was in error because the prosecution based its charge on the fraud 
clause of § 371.  Id. at 900.  The defendant asserted that the offense clause of § 371 was a 
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and § 1956(h) consist of agreement, intent to complete the offense 
conspired, and knowledge that the conspiracy existed; however, only 
§ 371 requires commission of overt acts.66  Like the MLCA, the general 
conspiracy statute is given a broad interpretation for each element.67 
Courts have been reluctant to consider conspiracies with specific 
objectives to be outside the scope of § 371.68  Conspiracy charges joined 
                                                                                                             
more appropriate justification for the conspiracy charge because he committed an offense 
against the United States by failing to file an accurate tax return.  Id.  The court held that 
filing a false tax return was fraud, reasoning that it concealed taxable income and 
prevented the IRS from performing an accurate collection.  Id. at 901; see also Outlaw v. 
United States, 81 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1936) (defining the phrase ―defraud the United 
States‖ as an attempt to defeat a lawful function of government); Coluccio v. United States, 
313 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that § 371 covers any act that may interfere 
or obstruct lawful government functions by deceit, craft, trickery, or otherwise dishonest 
means). 
66 See Davis & Waters, supra note 61, at 526–35 (discussing at length the four elements of 
conspiracy).  A conspiracy first exists when two or more co-conspirators make an original 
agreement to commit an offense and then work collectively toward completing the offense.  
Id. at 526.  The offense must include the illegal goal of defrauding or offending the United 
States.  Id. at 529–30.  Prosecutors must also prove that the co-conspirators knew they were 
voluntarily working toward a conspiracy.  Id. at 531–32.  The last requirement is that the co-
conspirators made overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Id. at 534.  But compare 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (requiring an overt act), with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (not requiring an overt act); 
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (stating that § 1956(h) creates a new 
offense and therefore does not need to have the same elements as § 371, including an overt 
act requirement).  On the other hand, the Department of Justice recommended that an overt 
act be included in § 1956(h) and that conspiracies for money laundering be indicted under 
this statute rather than § 371.  MADINGER, supra note 33, at 47.  There is no language in 
either statute, however, that provides for exclusion.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1956(h); Davis & 
Waters, supra note 61, at 524–25 (explaining that prosecutors may indict a number of 
offenses under § 371 even when statutes defining the offenses contain their own conspiracy 
provisions). 
67 Davis & Waters, supra note 61, at 526–35.  A conspiracy charge, for example, does not 
require formal agreement and can be found through circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 527.  
The illegal goal element may be met without co-conspirators knowing they were violating 
a specific federal statute constituting an offense or a broader fraudulent act against the 
United States.  Id. at 531.  Additionally, the knowledge element is lax, only requiring some 
knowledge of the conspiracy and its details or an act that advanced the conspiracy‘s 
objectives.  Id. at 532–33.  Alternatively, some courts require a slight connection or 
foreseeability of defendants‘ action toward the conspiracy.  Id. at 533; see, e.g., United States 
v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196–97 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 
586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991).  Lastly, 
an overt act can be any act, lawful or not, if it advances the conspiracy.  Davis & Waters, 
supra note 61, at 534.  A defendant may be liable for any offense another co-conspirator 
committed if the offense was in furtherance of or was a foreseeable result of the conspiracy.  
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946). 
68 Cf. Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 193–201 (discussing federal circuit court cases 
that questioned whether antitrust prosecutions should be distinguished from conspiracies 
in general).  Compare United States v. A-A-A Elec. Co., 788 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that an antitrust conspiracy for collusive bidding is no different than a  conspiracy 
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with tax evasion charges are common because tax evasion prevents the 
IRS from assessing and collecting taxes owed to the government.69  
Section 371 requires application of the limitation period of a joined 
offense rather than directly providing a limitation period on a conspiracy 
charge and excludes its application to more specific conspiracy 
provisions.70  Because the Internal Revenue Code does not have a 
conspiracy statute, prosecutors justify a tax-related conspiracy under § 
                                                                                                             
under § 371 and continues until all objectives of the conspiracy had been achieved), with 
United States v. Inyrco, 642 F.2d 290, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a bid-rigging 
conspiracy retained the character of an antitrust conspiracy after the defendants completed 
their specific objectives because they enjoyed the benefits of restrained trade).  Under § 371, 
a conspiracy to restrain trade would continue until the last overt act.  Doyle & Kenny, supra 
note 10, at 192–93.  This includes unjust enrichment as a result of the conspiracy, which 
Doyle and Kenny suggest, indefinitely extends the conspiracy.  Id. at 192.  In contrast, the 
statute of limitations under the Sherman Act commences when the conspirators succeed in 
their objectives or abandon the conspiracy altogether.  Id.  Doyle and Kenny contend that 
distinguishing an antitrust conspiracy from a conspiracy in general is appropriate because 
the goal in antitrust conspiracies is not to enrich the conspirators, but to restrain trade.  Id. 
at 204; see also United States v. Kissell, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910) (noting the difference 
between conspiracies where ―mere continuance of the result of a crime does not continue 
the crime‖ and a conspiracy that has ―a continuous result that will not continue without the 
continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up‖).  This distinction would also 
give effect to the statute of limitations in the Sherman Act.  Kissell, 218 U.S. at 205.  But cf. 
Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2190 (arguing that the lack of an overt act requirement in 
RICO prosecutions should not distinguish RICO conspiracies from traditional 
conspiracies).  According to Jancko-Baken, RICO conspiracies that occur in a business 
context group defendants together as part of one enterprise, illegal or not.  Id. at 2189.  The 
focus on the enterprise puts defendants long inactive in the conspiracy at risk of having no 
effective time bar to a RICO prosecution.  Id.  Under a traditional conspiracy analysis, the 
focus is on whether the objectives of the conspiracy have been met or the time at which a 
defendant‘s participation ends.  Id. at 2190.  To move away from considering the whole 
enterprise in RICO conspiracy prosecutions, Jancko-Baken contends, would protect 
conspirators that have ended their involvement in the conspiracy.  Id.  Jancko-Baken claims 
this proposal would treat each defendant‘s assertion that the indictment is barred by the 
statute of limitations separately, just as the general conspiracy statute would.  Id. 
69 See David Gomez & Keith Schomig, Tax Violations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1025, 1064 
(2007) (averring that conspiracies to commit tax violations are justified under the defraud 
clause in § 371); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (permitting joinder of offenses occurring within the 
same act or transaction to be presented against a defendant at a single trial). 
70 18 U.S.C. § 371; United States v. Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974).  The court in 
Lowder stated that: 
[t]he general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, contains no period of 
limitations.  Limitations, for indictments under § 371, are those applied 
by other provisions of law, or where there are none, by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3282 which is a general statute of limitations applicable ―[e]xcept as 
otherwise expressly provided by law.‖ 
Lowder, 492 F.2d at 956.  In addition, § 371 does not explicitly preclude its own application 
when another substantive statute allows for prosecution for conspiracy to commit that 
substantive act.  18 U.S.C. § 371. 
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371.71  This raises the question of whether tax evasion satisfies the 
concealment element of money laundering, which the Supreme Court 
addressed in Grunewald v. United States.72  In Grunewald, the Court ruled 
that acts committed after the goals of the conspiracy were completed 
cannot further the conspiracy without direct evidence that the 
conspirators agreed to those acts at the time they originally conspired 
                                                 
71 2008 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 57, § 23.02, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20Chapter%2023.htm#TOC1_
2.  Elsewhere, the Internal Revenue Code allows for conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, but only officers and employees of the United States acting under the revenue laws 
are subject to prosecution.  26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(4) (2006). 
72 See Aronoff, supra note 61, at 540 (noting the apparent problem in conspiracy law of 
prosecutors using acts of concealment as evidence of overt acts in furtherance of a 
conspiracy).  Aronoff states that the statutory definition of concealment is ambiguous and 
challenging for courts to define, which gives prosecutors deference in proving an act 
continued the conspiracy.  See id. at 541–42 (footnote omitted) (―A sympathetic Supreme 
Court has held that the prosecution may therefore rely on inferences drawn from an 
alleged conspirator‘s course of conduct to prove the scope of the alleged unlawful 
agreement.‖).  In Grunewald v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
alleged acts of concealment after a conspiracy.  353 U.S. 391, 394 (1957); see also United 
States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev‟d sub nom. United States v. 
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that violation of an anti-concealment statute 
constitutes concealment of a conspiracy, which the Second Circuit rejected on appeal).  The 
Second Circuit in Bufalino reaffirmed the direct evidence standard in Grunewald and 
rejected the Bonanno court‘s reasoning that violation of a statute is evidence of an original 
agreement to conceal.  Bufalino, 285 F.2d at 416.  The court stated that even if there was 
proof of an original agreement to conceal, the government has a burden to prove intent to 
conceal by those acts.  Id.  The Bufalino court then concluded that the government failed to 
meet its burden of proving that the defendants agreed to commit perjury and obstruction 
of justice in a formal investigation.  Id.  Because the alleged acts were not done during a 
formal investigation, the court found there was no direct evidence of an overt act to 
continue a conspiracy.  Id.; see also United States. v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(forbidding prosecution from implying a direct connection between an act of concealment 
and the original agreement by circumstantial evidence); United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 
954, 964 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding that an agreement between conspirators to furnish bail 
and counsel before committing bank robberies constituted direct evidence of concealment 
connected to the original agreement); Green v. U.S. Prob. Office, 504 F. Supp. 1003, 1005-06 
(N.D. Cal. 1980), rev‟d, 671 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that completion of a conspiracy 
precludes finding that subsequent acts of concealment are in furtherance of a conspiracy).  
But see United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009) 
(distinguishing Grunewald on the grounds that an act of concealment was a necessary part 
of a money laundering scheme; therefore, failing to file taxes after completion of a money 
laundering scheme was an act in furtherance of that scheme); United States v. Mackey, 571 
F.2d 376, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowing a jury to decide based on inferences whether an 
act of tax evasion was connected with the original agreement to conspire); United States v. 
Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971) (allowing a jury to infer that defendants intended 
to conceal misapplication of loans from the federal government because the defendants 
allegedly violated an anti-concealment statute); United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 
(7th Cir. 1966) (extending Grunewald‘s standard to require only ample evidence indicating a 
connection to an original agreement). 
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together.73  Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a conspiracy must end at 
some point in time.74  Following Grunewald, circuit court rulings, such as 
the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Hickey that required 
ample evidence of an agreement on the use of tax evasion as 
concealment, further muddled the issue.75  A recent First Circuit 
decision, United States v. Upton, diminished the Grunewald standard and 
held that direct evidence is not required to show that tax evasion was an 
act in furtherance of a money laundering scheme.76  Such rulings, like 
                                                 
73 Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 414–15.  The defendants in Grunewald conspired to commit tax 
evasion through the use of one of the defendants, a lawyer who obtained no prosecution 
rulings in favor of some defendants who were suspected of evading their taxes.  Id. at 395.  
In return for obtaining these rulings the lawyer-defendant was paid, the reporting of which 
was then covered up.  Id. at 395–96.  Further investigation by the IRS eventually made the 
taxpayer-defendants reveal the conspiracy in which they were involved, leading to 
subsequent prosecution.  Id.  The defendants appealed, arguing their prosecution occurred 
after the limitation period in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 had expired.  Id.  The Court found in favor of 
the defendants.  Id. at 415.  The lawyer-defendant‘s act of concealing the reports per an 
agreement, the Court reasoned, could not be deemed a part of the original conspiracy of tax 
evasion.  Id. at 404 (following Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949), which 
rejected the government‘s argument that the statement implied a conspiracy to conceal for 
lack of an express agreement to conceal and held that an out-of-court statement made by a 
co-conspirator regarding a conspiracy was not in furtherance of the conspiracy).  Thus, the 
Court permitted the defendants to have a new trial because their current convictions for 
conspiracy would have rested on impermissible grounds.  Id. at 424. 
74 Id. at 404–05 (stating that policy concerns about extending the scope of a conspiracy 
beyond Congress‘s imposed limitation period requires that not all acts of concealment 
constitute furtherance of a conspiracy). 
75 Hickey, 360 F.2d at 141.  The defendants in Hickey appealed a conviction for conspiracy 
to defraud a savings and loan association.  Id. at 130.  One of the appeals concerned the 
government‘s admission of post-conspiracy evidence, which the defendants contended was 
inadmissible because the conspiracy had already ended.  Id. at 140.  The court accepted the 
defendants‘ argument that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald controlled, but 
stated that the evidence was still admissible.  Id. at 141.  The court reasoned that by 
disguising the fraudulent nature of the loans and their borrowers, the defendants‘ acts 
constituted a conspiratorial design.  Id.  Additionally, acts after the completion of the 
defendants‘ objectives, including altering trusts and stifling a third-party who signed off on 
the loans, supplied ample evidence that the acts of concealment were part of the original 
conspiratorial design.  Id. 
76 See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13.  In Upton, the defendant used admittedly stolen money to 
partly purchase property.  Id. at 6.  In 1997, he then paid the remaining balance with a 
series of cashier‘s checks to various banks or the same bank several times, after which an 
accomplice took title by way of a trust.  Id. at 6–7.  The defendant and his accomplice then 
used this property to take out sham mortgages and in 1999 sold the property for a greater 
amount than purchased.  Id. at 7.  The defendant filed his tax return for 1997 in 2000, 
omitting the stolen money from his reported income.  Id.  Subsequent tax returns from him 
or his accomplice were either false or not filed.  Id.  In 2004, following an indictment for 
money laundering and an additional indictment for money laundering and tax evasion, a 
jury found the defendant guilty.  Id. at 8.  The district court did not allow a jury instruction 
on the limitation period because the defendant had not raised it as a defense at the charge 
conference.  Id. at 7–8.  The defendant appealed, claiming the statute of limitations barred 
Marusarz: Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry:  Preserving the Policy Behin
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
272 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
Upton and Hickey, have implications for statutes of limitations, which 
will be introduced in the next Section.77 
B. Federal Statutes of Limitations 
This Section will discuss statutes of limitations and their relationship 
to the crime of money laundering.78  First, this Section will explain the 
legislative policy behind statutes of limitations in state and federal law 
and their general characteristics.79  Next, this Section will discuss the 
                                                                                                             
the charge of conspiracy to launder money.  Id. at 8.  The First Circuit rejected the 
defendant‘s argument that Grunewald applied.  Id. at 13.  The defendant raised four points, 
all of which the court rejected in upholding the indictment.  Id.  First, the concealment 
provision in § 1956 required the prosecution to prove that the defendant designed the act to 
conceal the proceeds, which is a jury question and one the jury could have reasonably 
found.  Id. at 11–12; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (statutory numbering system 
omitted) (including a requirement that the defendant know that the transaction was 
―designed in whole or in part—to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, 
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity‖).  Next, the 
court responded to the defendant‘s argument that Grunewald limited the scope of defining 
an act of concealment up to the point when the anticipated economic benefits were 
realized.  Upton, 559 F.3d at 13.  The court rejected this argument, stating that the jury could 
have reasonably found that the evasion of taxes furthered the main objective of the 
defendant‘s money laundering scheme.  Id. at 13–14.  Third, the court rejected the 
defendant‘s claim that there was no expressed original agreement to satisfy Grunewald 
because the First Circuit required only that the act of concealment had to be foreseeable to 
one co-conspirator.  Id. at 14.  Finally, the defendant‘s argument that his estrangement from 
his co-conspirators amounted to a withdrawal from the conspiracy held little weight 
because the defendant waived this defense by not affirmatively ending the conspiracy.  Id. 
at 15.  The First Circuit in Upton stated as an aside that concealment in a money laundering 
scheme prevents authorities from discovering the illegal nature of the proceeds and is as 
important as repainting a car in a conspiracy of grand theft auto.  Id. at 13 n.9; see United 
States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 859 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that concealment of financial 
transactions by tax evasion was central to the conspiracy to make fraudulent transactions, 
thus the holding in Grunewald and in subsequent cases would not support finding the 
conspiracy finished before the acts of alleged concealment); United States v. Goldberg, 105 
F.3d 770, 774–75 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that defendant filing false tax returns, without 
evidence that co-conspirators agreed to this, constituted an act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy because it enabled the co-conspirators to interfere with the IRS); United States v. 
Esacove, 943 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that a defendant‘s statements to an FBI 
informant were not hearsay because the defendant made them to conceal a conspiracy to 
commit money laundering and were a necessary part of furthering that conspiracy). 
77 See infra Part II.B (discussing the policies behind statutes of limitations, giving special 
attention to the federal statutes of limitations for non-capital offenses and tax crimes). 
78 See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the policy behind statutes of limitations in general, 
the federal general statute of limitations that acts as a fallback provision for non-capital 
offenses, the statute of limitations applicable to some tax offenses, and the relationship 
between the statutes in the context of a money laundering prosecution). 
79 See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the policy and intent legislatures may have in enacting 
a statute of limitations, the common characteristics of statutes, and how courts interpret 
them). 
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federal general statute of limitations for non-capital offenses, which 
applies to money laundering crimes, and the statute of limitations that 
applies to tax offenses.80 
1. Policy and General Characteristics of Statutes of Limitations 
Legislatures may impose a time limit for a general or specific cause 
of action to encourage, among other things, diligent action by litigants to 
bring a cause of action.81  The Supreme Court views statutes of 
limitations as statutes of repose ―established to cut off rights, justifiable 
or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be strictly 
adhered to by the judiciary.‖82  These are policy-based instruments that 
balance the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and society.83  They also 
represent the intentions of legislatures related to causes of action.84 
                                                 
80 See infra Part II.B.2 (introducing the federal general statute of limitations, the statute of 
limitations applicable to federal tax offenses, the characteristics of these statutes, and 
interpretations of these statutes by federal courts). 
81 See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations:  Limitations by 
Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 457–58 (1993) (stating that legislatures have enacted statutes of 
limitations applicable to ―common groups or categories of actions‖ and ones that act as 
fallback or catch-all provisions applicable to any cause of action that lacks a limitation 
period of its own).  These statutes deny a plaintiff or a prosecutor the right to litigate a 
cause of action if he fails to commence the action before the amount of time provided by 
the statute passes.  Id. at 457.  For a discussion of additional policy goals underlying 
statutes of limitations, see infra notes 82–94 (explaining the most prevalent policy goals 
guiding statutes of limitations). 
82 Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947).  The Court admitted that when a statute 
of limitation period expires and renders the court unable to litigate the claim, it may result 
in inequities between the parties.  Id. at 539.  The Court restricted the judiciary‘s role in 
providing remedies when the limitation period expires, stating that only the legislature can 
provide such remedies and affirming the legislature‘s interest in enacting statutes of 
limitations.  Id. 
83 Nelson, supra note 81, at 462.  Plaintiffs share society‘s interest in having a claim 
litigated.  Id. at 462–63.  Nelson explains the hypothetical process used by a legislature to 
enact a statute of limitations as follows: 
To choose an appropriate limitations period, the legislature must 
evaluate the nature of the underlying cause of action, its policies, and 
society‘s interests in having the right asserted.  Then the legislature 
must select a reasonable time in which the plaintiff can discover, 
investigate, and assert his or her claim.  The legislature must also 
estimate how long the evidence and witnesses will be available and 
reliable.  The time period chosen is the period after which the need for 
repose and avoiding stale claims outweighs the interests in enforcing 
the claim. 
Id. at 463–64 (foonotes omitted); see also Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Statute of 
Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 250–52 (1995) (stating 
that statutes of limitations, particularly criminal ones, are strictly a matter of legislative 
choice at the federal and state level).  Furthermore, criminal statutes of limitations are 
curious inventions in American jurisprudence, lacking foundation in English common law.  
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The Supreme Court has held that courts should not question the 
legislative intent in enacting a statute of limitations.85  The role of courts, 
rather, is to determine what limitation period governs.86  A court must 
also evaluate the conditions that require it to toll a statute of limitations 
and not bar an action against a defendant.87  Courts approach statutes of 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 253–55.  Criminal statutes of limitations became popular as the judiciary became more 
responsive to the policy motivations behind civil statutes of limitations.  Id. at 259. 
84 Nelson, supra note 81, at 463 (―Time-bars also reflect the legislature‘s evaluation of the 
underlying cause of action and the policies implicated.  A short period may reflect 
disapproval of the underlying right, a desire to protect the defendant, or the need for 
prompt dispute resolution.‖).  Other common law jurisdictions also view statutes of 
limitations as legislative tools to advance the legislature‘s policy interests as well as 
executive tools to allow prosecutorial discretion.  See, e.g., DEP‘T OF FIN. CAN., ENHANCING 
CANADA‘S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING REGIME § 6.15 
(2005), available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/enhancing_-eng.asp (advocating for the 
extension of the country‘s non-compliance limitation period in Canada‘s money laundering 
statute in order to provide prosecutors greater flexibility in choosing whether to prosecute).  
But see Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law:  A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 
102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1954) (claiming that the policies behind statutes of limitations 
are superfluous and represent no particular legislative motivation to provide a limitation 
period).  Elaborating on a possible countervailing result of statutes of limitations favoring 
defendants, the author states: 
[T]here is the possibility that the statutes may to a certain extent 
encourage criminal activity by diminishing the certainty of 
punishment.  There may be a particular danger that where a first 
offender‘s prosecution is barred by a statute, he may be encouraged to 
return to criminal activity.  With the habitual criminal upon whom 
prior legal sanctions have apparently had little effect, perhaps the 
criminal law is best served by his removal from society; to the extent 
that this is true, and assuming that there is no doubt of guilt, the 
statute of limitations is not desirable.  Obviously, the statute also 
prevents realization of the state‘s desire for retribution. 
Id. at 634.  The author then suggests giving prosecutors discretion whether to continue 
prosecution as an alternative to the limitations period.  Id. 
85 Kavanagh, 332 U.S. at 539 (giving deference to the legislature and withholding judicial 
speculation as to why the legislature wanted a specific limitation period for a cause of 
action). 
86 E.g., id. at 538–39 (rejecting the government‘s argument that a four-year statute of 
limitations applied to a claim of tax controversy where the commencement occurred three 
and a half years prior to the indictment because the specific cause of action warranted a 
two-year limitation period under a different statute and thus barred the action). 
87 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002) (acknowledging that limitation 
periods are subject to equitable tolling and states that the Court will presume Congress 
drafts limitation periods with equitable tolling in mind, particularly in applying rules and 
principles of equity jurisprudence).  Exceptions to this rule apply when the statute does not 
expressly provide for an exception or counters Congress‘s intent.  Id. at 49; see also Diaz v. 
Antilles Conversion & Exp., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.P.R. 1999) (stating that federal 
law governs equitable tolling if a federal statute sets the limitation period).  Furthermore, a 
litigant must assert an opponent‘s misdeeds in order to request that a court toll the 
limitation period despite the statute.  E.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 
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limitations with policies that seek to balance the interests between 
plaintiffs and defendants, compel plaintiffs to take action, protect 
defendants from stale claims, protect defendants from surprising 
evidence, fraud, or both, and promote efficiency in courts.88  A related 
policy may force courts to use analogous limitation periods if a statute 
does not provide one for a specific cause of action.89  Likewise, where 
                                                                                                             
467–68 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff‘s assertion that defendant misled her on 
information because her claims were vague).  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3282, a properly submitted 
indictment tolls the limitation period.  United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 
1976).  Tolling a limitation period means that the period stops running.  BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1625 (9th ed. 2009).  In simpler terms, tolling suspends the statute of 
limitations where prosecutors or plaintiffs are unable to commence an action through no 
fault of their own.  JAMES E. CLAPP, WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 431 (2000).  
88 See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1980) (stating in dicta that statute 
of limitations have long been respected as fundamental to the judicial system, which 
recognizes the interests of plaintiffs not to have defendants keep him from litigating his 
claim, but also recognizes the interest of defendants not to have a plaintiff litigate a claim 
after so much time that it impairs the fact-finding process or upsets expectations); 
DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cen. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1999) (―[Statutes 
of limitation] reflect legislative judgments concerning the relative values of repose on the 
one hand, and vindication of both public and private legal rights on the other.‖).  For an 
example of how limitations compel the plaintiff to take action, see Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 
981 P.2d 79, 87 (Cal. 1999), which states that the intent of statutes of limitations is to force 
plaintiffs to bring fresh claims against defendants.  For examples of how limitation periods 
protect defendants, see Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1973), which states 
that statutes of limitations are ―designed to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared‖; Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 
F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1999), which recognizes the policy of protecting defendants from 
stale evidence that is behind statutes of limitations; and Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 
281, 288 n.9 (4th Cir. 1999), which states that a statute of limitations puts a defendant on 
notice of claims against him within the specified period.  For examples of how limitation 
periods promote judicial efficiency, see English v. Bousamra, 9 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (W.D. 
Mich. 1998), which stated that limitation periods ―promote judicial efficiency by preventing 
defendants and courts from having to litigate stale claims‖; and Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 
960 (Ariz. 1998), which explained that statutes of limitations are intended to prevent 
plaintiffs from making stale claims against both the defendant‘s and the court‘s interests.  
But see Pearson v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that while the 
policy behind statutes of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale claims, the substantive 
character of the limitation period in relation to the claim may lean in favor of the defendant 
when two statutes of limitations procedurally conflict). 
89 Boyne v. Town of Glastonbury, 955 A.2d 645, 652 (Conn. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff‘s 
argument that the statute lacking a limitation period did not bar his claim because public 
policy requires courts to offer certainty to both parties and thus would favor applying a 
limitation period in a cause of action).  The most applicable statute rule is derived from the 
Supreme Court‘s opinion in DelCostello v. Int‟l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162 (1983).  In 
DelCostello, the Court addressed the issue of whether federal courts should apply state 
limitation periods for enforcement of federal law.  Id. at 161–62.  The Court answered this 
in the negative, preferring instead an approach of borrowing federal time bars when 
applicable:  ―[W]e have declined to borrow state statutes but have instead used timeliness 
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causes of action may include multiple statutes of limitations, courts 
might look at the substance of the action to determine which statute of 
limitations controls.90 
Similarly, state courts resort to statutory construction principles 
based on the common law, favoring statutes of limitations that proffer 
the longest limitation period or establish the most specific cause of 
action.91  Federal courts discuss whether to apply the most suitable 
                                                                                                             
rules drawn from federal law—either express limitations periods from related federal 
statutes, or such alternatives as laches.‖  Id. at 162.  The Court explained that state statutes 
of limitations are mechanical and do not accommodate principles of equity inherent in 
federal causes of action.  Id. 
90 See, e.g., Vrban v. Deere & Co., 129 F.3d 1008, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 1997).  Vrban, heard in 
the Eighth Circuit, interpreted Iowa state statutes of limitations.  Id. at 1009.  The plaintiff in 
Vrban sued the defendant company for wrongful termination after requesting 
compensation for work-related injuries.  Id.  The defendant claimed that the state‘s two-
year statute of limitations on tort claims applied because the termination was the basis for 
either a tort claim or one concerning wages, which also has a two-year limitation period.  
Id.  The plaintiff argued that the underlying claim was one that did not provide a two-year 
statute of limitations but would instead trigger a five-year limitation period.  Id.  The 
Eighth Circuit applied the Iowa Supreme Court‘s rule that determining the statute of 
limitations for a specific cause of action requires looking at the actual nature of the action.  
Id.  Referencing Iowa Supreme Court holdings on what constitutes a tort action, the court 
then held that the five-year statute of limitations applied, reasoning that wrongful 
termination of employment did not constitute a tort.  Id. at 1010. 
91 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Grant, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1298 (N.D. Okla. 1998) 
(holding that when two statutes of limitations may apply in any given case, the court will 
look at the statute containing the longer limitation period); Gustafson v. Bridger Coal Co., 
834 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Wyo. 1993) (stating that under Wyoming law, absence of 
legislative intent as to whether a statute of limitations applies to an unspecified tort action 
allows courts to prefer longer limitation periods); McDowell v. Alaska, 957 P.2d 965, 971 
(Alaska 1998) (favoring the longer of two limitation periods because courts disfavor the use 
of the statute as a defense); Malone v. Malone, 991 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Ark. 1999) (stating that 
policy dictates using the longer limitation period where the issue is unclear); Amco Ins. Co. 
v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. 1997) (favoring the longer limitation period 
when two statutes of limitations apply because such statutes ―are in derogation of a 
presumptively valid claim‖); Global Fin. Servs. v. Duttenhefner, 575 N.W.2d 667, 671 (N.D. 
1998) (favoring the longer limitation period when there is a reasonable dispute between 
two applicable statutes of limitations).  The rule favoring the longest limitation period may 
only apply if the favored limitation period is reasonable.  Guertin v. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072, 
1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).  For examples of courts applying the most specific cause of 
action rule, see Grulke v. Erickson, 920 P.2d 845, 849 (Colo. App. 1995), which explained that 
the statute of limitations that is the most specific, most recently enacted, and offers the 
longest limitation period should apply in favor of another applicable statute; Watseka First 
Nat‟l Bank v. Horney, 686 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997), which stated that the statute 
of limitations that most specifically relates to the cause of action must be applied; Boyd v. C 
& H Transp., 902 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. 1995), which stated that ―[a] specific statute of 
limitation preempts a general statute of limitation where there is a conflict‖; Reinke Mfg. Co. 
v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Neb. 1999), which favored a statute of limitations providing 
a specific cause of action over a more general statute of limitations out of respect for the 
legislature‘s intention that a special limitation period apply to a particular subject; and 
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statute rule or state statute of limitations depending on the cause of 
action, but they also question the application of federal limitation 
periods to state causes of action where there is Congressional silence and 
lack of caselaw.92  While states create substantive rights that underlie 
statutes of limitations, the federal statutes of limitations adopt the 
common law approach that the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense the defendant may waive without a timely assertion.93  
Regardless of whether they are substantive rights or affirmative 
defenses, statutes of limitations balance the following interests:  (1) the 
protection of defendants from claims that are too old to litigate, (2) the 
opportunity for prosecutors and plaintiffs to bring claims, and (3) the 
preservation of judicial resources.94 
2. The General Federal Statute of Limitations and the Tax Crimes 
Statute Under § 6531 
The federal criminal statute of limitations for non-capital offenses 
(―general statute of limitations‖ or ―§ 3282‖) establishes a five-year 
limitation period except when another statute expressly imposes a 
limitation period.95  Under the general statute of limitations, an 
indictment must be made within five years of the commission of the 
                                                                                                             
Thomas Steel, Inc. v. Wilson Bennett, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998), which 
affirmed that when a court must select a statute of limitations to apply to a statutory cause 
of action, ―a special statutory provision which relates to the specific subject matter involved 
in the legislation is controlling over a general statutory provision which might otherwise be 
applicable.‖ 
92 See, e.g., Wallace v. Hardee‘s of Oxford, 874 F. Supp. 374, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1995) 
(applying DelCostello in lieu of defendant‘s argument that because the cause of action 
lacked a statute of limitations, the court should borrow the most applicable limitation 
period from federal law).  The court in Wallace, in an action against the defendant for 
violating the Veterans‘ Reemployment Rights Act, found that legislative silence on the 
statute made it unclear as to whether federal limitation periods should apply.  Id. at 376.  
The court found, however, that a congressional report and the lack of federal case law on 
the matter went against applying a statute of limitations.  Id. at 376–77.  Thus, the court 
decided to not apply a federal limitation period because the statute did not authorize it.  Id. 
at 377. 
93 Nelson, supra note 81, at 459–60.  If a defendant waived the defense, however, he may 
still raise it in an amended answer if it is equitable to do so.  Id. at 460.  Raising it in this 
way, the affirmative defense would still be subject to summary judgment, as well as a 
motion to dismiss.  Id. 
94 See supra notes 81–93 (stating how the federal courts have recognized the three policy 
interests underlying using statutes of limitations and giving a list of state and federal cases 
where imposing limitation periods influences litigants in ways that favor these policies). 
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006) (―Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no 
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the 
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense 
shall have been committed.‖). 
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offense.96  The circuit courts have found that should the prosecution 
accomplish this, neither the due process rights nor the speedy trial right 
of the defendant is violated.97  By contrast, § 3282‘s counterpart statute of 
limitations for capital offenses, § 3281, offers no limitation period.98 
One of the main goals behind the general statute of limitations is to 
protect the defendant from a prosecution, which, obscured over time, 
would be difficult to defend.99  The second reason is to grant the 
prosecution enough time to collect information necessary for an 
indictment.100  It does not give the prosecution, however, a license to 
delay an indictment against the defendant.101  Federal courts have 
                                                 
96 Id.  Bringing an indictment tolls the statute when it is considered found according to 
the statute.  E.g., United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that an 
indictment is found when brought before a grand jury and filed, which tolls the limitation 
period). 
97 See United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding no due process 
violation where the prosecution only delayed indicting the defendant to ensure a more 
certain case against him and was not done to gain a tactical advantage which would 
prejudice the defendant); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 882 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(rejecting defendants‘ argument that the prosecution‘s delay in bringing the indictment 
violated due process because the prosecution brought the indictment within the limitation 
period and was not found to be prejudicial); United States v. Hephner, 410 F.2d 930, 932–33 
(7th Cir. 1969) (holding that prosecutorial delay in bringing an indictment did not violate 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because the indictment was timely 
and the defendant did not make a request for a speedy trial). 
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006) (―An indictment for any offense punishable by death may 
be found at any time without limitation.‖). 
99 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970), in which the Supreme Court 
stated that: 
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal 
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence 
of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal 
sanctions.  Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from 
having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may 
have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the 
danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.  
Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law 
enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal 
activity. 
Id. 
100 See United States v. Gibson, 490 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2007) (―The statute of 
limitations and its tolling provisions are designed to allow the government time to 
investigate crimes while protecting individuals from defending against charges for distant 
offenses.‖). 
101 See United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Klopfer v. 
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1966)) (―Absent a statute of limitations, an indefinite 
suspension of prosecution impairs a defendant‘s constitutional rights and prolongs the 
defendant‘s ‗anxiety and concern‘ over the pending charges.‖). 
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construed statutes of limitations in favor of the defendant.102  Similarly, 
courts also interpret limitations statutes in favor of repose and place a 
time limit on prosecutors to initiate an action.103 
In federal law, the general statute of limitations acts as a fallback 
provision limiting application where a crime falls within a more specific 
statute of limitations in the United States Code.104  Thus, the general 
statute of limitations acts as a fallback or catch-all provision with respect 
to all conspiracy charges under § 371.105  It is not uncommon for federal 
                                                 
102 See e.g., United States v. Satz, 109 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D.N.Y. 1952) (stating that statutes 
of limitations are ―matters of grace‖ and ―are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
defendant‖). 
103 E.g., United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)  In Scharton, the Court held that 
a provision of the Revenue Act expanding the limitation period for attempts to defraud the 
United States by tax evasion did not apply in favor of the defendant.  Id.  The Court 
interpreted the language of the statute narrowly, stating that the exception specified the 
crime of fraud, which the government failed to prove because it did not show the 
defendant‘s intent to commit fraud.  Id. at 521.  The Court also rejected the government‘s 
theory that fraud is an inherent element of tax evasion, stating that fraud is an element in 
other offenses in the Internal Revenue Code.  Id.  Thus, the Court held in favor of the 
statute‘s three-year limitation period, stating that ―as the section has to do with statutory 
crimes, it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose, and ought not to be extended by 
construction to embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating 
offenses.‖  Id. at 522; see also United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968) 
(acknowledging the rule interpreting statutes in favor of repose following Scharton, but 
rejecting defendant‘s theory that the six-year limitation period for tax evasion commences 
on the date taxes are due based on Congressional intent relative to the statute of 
limitations). 
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2006) (stating that no limitation period applies to an offense of 
sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping of a child unless the child is no longer living, 
at which point the limitation period is ten years after the offense); id. § 3285 (applying one-
year limitation period in proceeding for criminal contempt against any person, corporation, 
or association); id. § 3286 (instituting an eight-year limitation period for terrorism offenses 
defined by statute and removing limitation period for terrorism offenses resulting in or 
creating a foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury of another); id. § 3291 
(expanding the limitation period to ten years for circumventing or conspiring to 
circumvent federal nationality, citizenship, and passport laws); § 3295 (imposing a ten-year 
limitation period on non-capital arson offenses); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006) (applying a three-
year limitation period for tax-related offenses which is expanded to six years when 
exceptions apply).  The Supreme Court has held, however, that this does not apply to 
regulations that do not impose perpetual duties.  E.g., Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120 (holding a 
regulation empowered by the Draft Act did not imply Congress‘s intent to make failing to 
register for a military draft a continuing offense that keeps the limitation period running).  
Congress eventually superseded Toussie.  United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1296 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (stating that Toussie no longer applies after Congress amended the Draft Act 
imposing a five-year limitation period to run after the defendant reached the age of twenty-
six). 
105 See United States v. Grace, 434 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884 n.5 (D. Mont. 2006) (―Because the 
conspiracy statute does not contain its own statute of limitations, the offense carries the 
five-year statute of limitations generally applicable to non-capital federal criminal 
offenses.‖); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (lacking a limitation period for conspiracy charges). 
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courts to borrow this limitation period where there are no other 
applicable statutes of limitations available in a cause of action.106  For 
example, 26 U.S.C. § 6531 sets a three-year limitation period for tax 
offenses unless an offense falls within one of eight exceptions, which 
extends the limitation period to six years.107 
                                                 
106 Nelson, supra note 81, at 486–87 (stating that borrowing the most suitable federal 
statute of limitations, while not the norm, has happened when it is more analogous than 
available state statutes and ―when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of 
litigation make the rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial 
lawmaking‖). 
107 26 U.S.C. § 6531.  The section provides in part: 
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any of the 
various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws unless the 
indictment is found or the information instituted within 3 years next 
after the commission of the offense, except that the period of limitation 
shall be 6 years— 
(1) for offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to 
defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by 
conspiracy or not, and in any manner; 
(2) for the offense of willfully attempting in any manner to 
evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof; 
(3) for the offense of willfully aiding or assisting in, or 
procuring, counseling, or advising, the preparation or 
presentation under, or in connection with any manner arising 
under, the internal revenue laws, of a false or fraudulent return, 
affidavit, claim, or document (whether or not such falsity or fraud 
is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or 
required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document); 
 . . . . 
(5) for offenses described in sections 7206(1) and 7207 (relating 
to false statements and fraudulent documents); 
 . . . . 
(8) for offenses arising under section 371 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code, where the object of the conspiracy is to 
attempt in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment 
thereof. 
Id.; see also United States v. Ely, 140 F.3d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir. 1998) (favoring the general 
statute of limitations over § 6531 in an indictment for conspiracy when the indictment did 
not include a specific tax violation).  The defendant in Ely claimed that § 6531 applied 
because the underlying offense fell within the statute.  Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090.  The court 
rejected this claim, reasoning that one of the elements of that offense did not apply to him.  
Id.  Thus, the indictment was subject to a § 3282 limitation period because it was only for 
conspiracy to commit that offense.  Id; cf. United States v. Lowry, 409 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740–
41 (W.D. Va. 2006) (stating that the broad purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act requires the 
general statute of limitations, which did not toll prosecution for attempting to prevent the 
IRS from collecting taxes by not reporting financial instruments owned in foreign 
countries).  The court in Ely agreed with the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Lowder that 
―[l]imitations, for indictments under § 371, are those supplied by other provisions of law, 
or where there are none, by . . . § 3282.‖  Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (quoting United States v. 
Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974)).  The underlying offense in Lowder was tax 
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Under § 3282, commencement of the limitation period begins at the 
completion of the offense, the substance of which Congress defines by 
statute, and an indictment must appear within five years after 
commencement.108  The Supreme Court has held that legislative intent 
should guide the courts in determining when the statute of limitations 
begins to run.109  The lower federal courts, however, are split in 
                                                                                                             
evasion, which fell within an exception in § 6531 that extended the limitation period to six 
years.  Lowder, 492 F.2d at 955; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2006) (stating that a person 
commits tax evasion by willfully making false statements on a tax return, statement, or 
other document).  The defendant argued that the underlying offense was conspiracy, which 
would be subject to § 3282 instead of § 6531.  Lowder, 492 F.2d at 955.  The court disagreed, 
preferring to adhere to a strict reading of both statutes of limitations and held that § 6531 
applied when the indictment accuses defendant of conspiring to commit tax evasion.  Id. at 
956.  The discrepancy between these two cases appears to have originated from a footnote 
in Grunewald stating that § 3282 governed in that case.  See Grunewald v. United States, 353 
U.S. 391, 396 n.8 (1957) (stating that § 3282 will apply unless otherwise provided by 
statute).  The court in Lowder reasoned that the Grunewald footnote was not a part of the 
holding, and that the applicable tax code statute of limitations was overlooked by the 
Court.  Lowder, 492 F.2d at 956.  The government, however, can defeat a limitations defense 
under § 6531 by filing the indictment for tax evasion within the limitation period.  Gomez 
& Schomig, supra note 69, at 1032–33. 
108 18 U.S.C. § 3282.  Section 3282 excludes the day of the offense for purposes of 
commencement.  United States. v. Guerro, 694 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the 
general rule that commencement for a conspiracy indictment begins the day after the 
defendants committed the offense); United States v. Joseph, 765 F. Supp. 326, 327–29 (E.D. 
La. 1991) (holding that an indictment filed on the anniversary of an offense was timely 
because the policy of the statute of limitations is in favor of defendants and caselaw to the 
contrary is irrelevant); cf. Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 439 (1931) 
(holding that the then statute of limitations for tax assessments excluded the day of the tax 
offense because of the statute‘s plain meaning that an assessment must be within five years 
after a return was made).  But see United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(noting in the restatement of the facts that an indictment for child abuse, which began on 
February 7, 1988, would be barred if made after February 7, 1993, under the general statute 
of limitations); United States v. Dunn, 961 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that for mail 
fraud convictions under § 3282, commencement begins on the date of mailings). 
109 United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968).  In Habig, the defendants appealed 
their conviction for filing false tax returns, claiming that the six-year statute of limitations 
for tax crimes barred prosecution.  Id. at 222.  The Court addressed the issue of whether the 
indictment, filed on August 12, 1966, was timely when the defendants filed their tax returns 
on August 12 and 15, 1960.  Id. at 223.  The defendants argued that the limitation period 
commenced on May 15, 1960, the date when the returns were due to be filed, which would 
have made the indictment untimely.  Id.  The Court rejected this argument, stating that the 
provision in the statute of limitations commenced the limitation period on the initial return 
due date only when the filing was made prior to that date.  Id. at 225; see 26 U.S.C. § 6513(a) 
(stating that the limitation period commencing on ―the last day prescribed for filing the 
return or paying the tax . . . without regard to any extension of time granted the taxpayer 
and without regard to any election to pay the tax in installments‖ applies in the context of 
early returns or advance payment of taxes).  The Court reasoned that Congress did not 
intend § 6513(a) to apply to § 6531 except when the tax returns were filed early.  Habig, 390 
U.S. at 225.  Thus, the Court held that the limitation period commenced at the last act in 
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determining the exact moment when the limitation period commences 
for purposes of the tax evasion statute; some courts place 
commencement from the last day the tax return was due, while other 
courts mark it from the defendant‘s last affirmative act.110  Additional 
evasive acts further complicate the question of commencement, as they 
keep the limitation period running.111  In the context of conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, the general rule is that the limitation period 
commences at the time of the last overt act during the existence of the 
conspiracy.112  This rendered dormant the rule, crafted by a scant 
                                                                                                             
furtherance of the defendants‘ tax evasion scheme, within the six-year limitation period.  Id. 
at 227. 
110 See United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the statute 
of limitations runs on tax evasion when the defendant fails to file taxes on or before the due 
date); United States v. Kafes, 214 F.2d 887, 890 (3d Cir. 1954) (agreeing with the prosecution 
that the due date for filing taxes completes the crime of tax evasion); United States v. 
Sherman, 426 F. Supp. 85, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (calculating when the limitation period begins 
based on the last date that the taxes were due).  For examples of courts supporting the rule 
that the limitation period commences upon the defendant‘s last affirmative act, see United 
States v. Anderson, 319 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003), which distinguished Payne on the 
ground that the defendant was committing a series of tax evasions; United States v. Ferris, 
807 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986), which ruled that when the defendant attempted to evade 
payment of the 1977 income tax through acts done in 1979 and 1983, the limitations period 
commenced from the date in 1983 that the last act of evasion occurred, rather than the date 
that the 1977 taxes were due; United States v. Trownsell, 367 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 1966), 
which identified the defendant‘s liquidation of his assets and his deposit of the value 
received in an overseas bank account, which occurred prior to the due date for that year‘s 
tax payments, as the last affirmative acts of tax evasion; and United States v. Crocker, 753 F. 
Supp. 1209, 1214 (D. Del. 1991), which stated that the limitation period for evading 
payment of 1984 income tax commenced on the date it was due.  When defendants are 
alleged to have made false statements, the limitation period commences from the date the 
statement was made.  See United States v. Mousley, 194 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) 
(finding that offers to compromise with the government on back taxes owed gave false 
information, and thus constituted affirmative acts of tax evasion that marked the beginning 
of the limitation period).  The district court for the District of Columbia supported a third 
rule:  the statute of limitations does not bar a prosecution at any point after a defendant 
attempts to evade tax payment or fails to file taxes at some time during the original 
running of the six-year limitation period, implying a series of tax evasions.  United States v. 
Shorter, 608 F. Supp. 871, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1985). 
111 See Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1220 (maintaining adherence to the rule that the last 
affirmative act commences the limitation period); see also United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 
13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009) (stating that an act of tax evasion 
commenced the limitation period and furthered a conspiracy to commit money 
laundering). 
112 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).  For examples of what constitutes 
overt acts, see Jeffries, 405 F.3d at 683, which identified statutory sexual or physical abuse of 
a minor as overt acts; United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1988), which 
stated that a wire fraud scheme‘s last overt act was not the completion of the scheme, but 
the charged call; and Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1932), which held that 
mailing letters in furtherance of a mail fraud scheme was an overt act.  Certain 
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minority of courts, that a limitation period for a conspiracy indictment 
commences at the first overt act.113  This focus on last overt acts in a 
                                                                                                             
qualifications exist for the overt act requirement.  See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 
341, 355 (9th Cir. 1976) (alleging an overt act in the indictment is necessary); Eldredge v. 
United States, 62 F.2d 449, 450–51 (10th Cir. 1932) (stating that a defendant must commit 
the overt act to begin commencement); United States v. Mirabal Carrion, 140 F. Supp. 226, 
227 (D.P.R. 1956) (averring that where there are several overt acts, prosecution must 
sufficiently prove the last overt act to commence the limitation period); see also Jancko-
Baken, supra note 7, at 2175 (stating that the courts favor the last overt act rule because it is 
the equitable remedy that best balances the interests of the litigants and the courts). 
113 See Ex Parte Black, 147 F. 832, 841 (E.D. Wis. 1906) (determining that the conspiracy 
statute required the limitation period to commence after the completion of the first overt 
act); United States v. Owen, 32 F. 534, 536 (D. Or. 1887) (ruling that the limitation period 
runs from the first overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy).  The court in Owen presided 
over a conspiracy defined in the applicable statute as an agreement to defraud or commit 
an offense of revenue against the United States and an act of fraud or offense against the 
United States.  Owen, 32 F. at 536.  The applicable conspiracy statute read as follows: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against 
the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for 
any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable 
to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment 
for not more than two years or to both fine and imprisonment in the 
discretion of the court. 
Law of May 17, 1879, ch. 5440, 21 Stat. 4 (1879); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (criminalizing a 
conspiracy to defraud or commit an offense against the United States).  The court stated 
that the applicable statute of limitations for a conspiracy begins to run at ―the commission 
or consummation of the crime.‖  Owen, 32 F. at 537.  The court defined consummation of 
the crime as ―the first act done by any of the conspirators in pursuance thereof.‖  Id.  The 
limitation period began, the court determined, after the defendants committed the 
agreement and the conspiratorial act because the statute limited the scope of the conspiracy 
to those two elements.  Id.  The court also limited its ruling to conspiracy statutes 
pertaining to instantaneous crimes as distinguished from continuous crimes: 
An instantaneous crime, such as arson or killing, is consummated 
when the act is completed.  A continuous crime, such as carrying 
concealed weapons, endures after the period of consummation.  In the 
former case the statute of limitations begins to run with the 
consummation, while in the latter it only begins with the cessation of 
the criminal conduct or act.  But even then it is a bar to a prosecution 
for any act or part of the continuous crime which occurred three years 
prior to such time. 
Id.  The Eastern District of Wisconsin also considered the first overt act rule under the 
contemporaneous conspiracy statute, elaborating on the distinction between instantaneous 
and continuing crimes.  Black, 147 F. at 841.  The court in Black followed the District of 
Oregon in Owen by hesitating to accept the idea that conspiracy was a continuing crime.  Id.  
The court admitted that its reluctance stemmed from the view that no act can be in 
furtherance of a conspiracy after the defendants completely effectuate the conspiracy.  Id. at 
840.  Adhering to this view, the court regarded any doctrine that considers an act done 
after completion of a conspiracy as part of that conspiracy to be ―anomalous‖ because it 
―might prolong a conspiracy, and . . . keep it in active operation until every obligation 
incurred during the formative period of the plot had been liquidated.‖  Id.  The court 
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money laundering conspiracy shifts the focus to the results of 
conspiracies instead of the objectives agreed upon by the conspirators, 
which are not necessarily one and the same.114 
In summary, a problem with the money laundering statute appears 
when a money laundering offense becomes theoretically unending 
because it involves tax evasion and conspiracy within the laundering 
scheme.115  Congress drafted the MLCA to give broad reach to 
prosecutors when presented with the opportunity to indict defendants 
who committed any of a broad range of activities connected to money 
laundering schemes.116  Congress later amended the MLCA to allow 
prosecution of tax evasion as a method of concealing illegally derived 
funds.117  The MLCA, however, does not include provisions that allow 
                                                                                                             
considered the prosecution‘s argument that a conspiracy is a continuing crime, but only to 
the extent that the facts of a case make a conspiracy continuing.  Id. at 841.  The court 
rejected this argument, however, stating that the prosecution can allege a new conspiracy if 
the scheme continues by new overt acts within the period of limitation commencing upon 
commission of that new conspiracy.  Id.; see also 2 F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, 
DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES § 23.22 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the first 
overt act rule in Owen as a possible defense to a continually running statute of limitations 
in white-collar conspiracies). 
114 Cf., e.g., Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 192 (noting that antitrust conspirators may 
agree to restraining trade, but not to receive benefits from restraining trade after their 
objectives are accomplished).  Compare Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 403 (1957) 
(finding that an act of concealing records was not intended to further the scheme of tax 
evasion), with Upton, 559 F.3d at 13 (finding that tax evasion furthered the conspirators‘ 
agreement to launder funds through property transactions because it allowed the 
conspirators to benefit from their transactions). 
115 See MADINGER, supra note 33, at 48.  Following the established law that completing the 
crime of money laundering commences the limitation period, Madinger states that ―[t]his 
raises an interesting question:  If ‗dirty‘ money never gets really ‗clean,‘ when does one 
ever really stop laundering it?‖  Id.  In answering this question, Madinger gives an 
example: 
The answer may be ―never.‖  In at least one case, an individual who 
made money by smuggling marijuana in the 1970s was charged with 
money laundering in financial transactions that occurred after 2001.  
He knew the assets he was moving around were originally acquired 
with drug money, and he was still acting to conceal them and their 
source from the government.  The result was that, long after he left the 
drug business, he found himself looking at jail time for money 
laundering—something that wasn‘t even illegal back when he was a 
smuggler. 
Id. at 48–49.  Hence, Madinger states, ―investigators can reach back a very long way to 
catch money launderers.‖  Id. at 49. 
116 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the legislative intent behind the MLCA and case law 
interpreting the MLCA). 
117 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the nature of tax evasion and stating that Congress 
amended the MLCA to include within the scope of money laundering prosecutions the 
frequent use of tax evasion by launderers to conceal proceeds). 
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indictments for conspiracy with a money laundering scheme or 
provisions that establish a limitation period for such an indictment, 
which prompts prosecutors and courts to rely on fallback statutes to fill 
in the gaps.118  This omission has raised the question of whether a money 
laundering scheme will perpetually toll the statute of limitations.119 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Courts have given little critique to the MLCA, as only district courts 
have addressed the constitutionality of the MLCA with regard to the 
definition of proceeds and notice.120  Much of the criticism about the 
MLCA that does exist stems from its vagueness.121  A statute of 
limitations is absent, which requires prosecutors to apply § 3282.122  The 
MLCA also lacks a provision outlining prosecutions for conspiracies 
                                                 
118 See Strafer, supra note 33, at 206 (noting that the MLCA does not contain its own 
conspiracy provision and relies on § 371 for a conspiracy indictment).  Congress might 
have intended to leave out a conspiracy provision in the MLCA in order to allow money 
laundering prosecutions for situations not covered by existing law.  Id.  The MLCA subjects 
defendants to penalties for conspiring to commit a money laundering offense based on the 
particular offense committed.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); see also id. § 371 (subjecting conspirators 
to a defined penalty of five years, a fine, or both, for conspiring to defraud or commit an 
offense against the United States).  The language of the MLCA also does not include a 
limitation period for money laundering schemes.  Id. §§ 1956, 1957; see also id. § 3282 
(operating as a fallback statute of limitations for other statutory non-capital offenses that 
lack their own limitation periods). 
119 See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13 (asserting that prosecution of a money laundering scheme is 
successful upon a finding that failing to file taxes is in furtherance of a conspiracy and 
resets the limitation period).  Upton drew criticism because it rejected the principle that the 
Supreme Court established in Grunewald that acts of concealment did not necessarily 
continue the original offense.  John A. Townsend, Scoping the Conspiracy, 123 TAX NOTES 
1047, 1048–49 (2009), available at http://www.tjtaxlaw.com/123TN1047.pdf (echoing the 
Supreme Court‘s rejection of the prosecution‘s argument in Grunewald that a defendant 
―concealing the substantive crime after its commission was within the implied scope of the 
conspiracy to commit the substantive crime and that the overt acts of concealment thus set 
the statute of limitations for prosecution‖). 
120 Kacarab, supra note 23, at 41–42; see also United States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031, 
1034–35 (D. Nev. 1989) (stating that the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 imposing criminal 
penalties on avoiding a transaction reporting requirement is not vague because ―[t]here is 
nothing in the legislative history [demonstrating] that Congress intended that the word 
‗avoid‘‖ mean anything other than its common definition); United States v. Mainieri, 691 F. 
Supp. 1394, 1397 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that proceeds are clearly defined by the context of 
the statute, and that individuals who engage in financial transactions meant to conceal 
illegally obtained money are put on notice by the statute‘s unambiguous wording). 
121 Strafer, supra note 33, at 206.  Congress enacted § 1956 ―hastily,‖ resulting in many 
crimes being outside its scope.  Id.  Despite the sophistication of many money laundering 
schemes, prosecutors must rely on other statutes as fallback statutes where the MLCA does 
not provide a provision specific to prosecuting money laundering crimes.  Id. 
122 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (stating that the limitation period for a non-capital offense is five 
years unless provided by another statute). 
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formed during a money laundering scheme, which gives prosecutors 
opportunity to use § 371 and that section‘s definition of the elements of 
conspiracy.123  The absence of these types of provisions in the MLCA has 
significant implications because it gives prosecutors power to indict a 
broad range of acts both inside and outside the scope of the original 
conspiratorial agreement.124  The abrogation of the strict standard set by 
the Supreme Court in Grunewald, requiring direct evidence that a post-
conspiracy act be an overt act in furtherance of the original agreement 
between conspirators, amplified the risk of over-prosecution when 
applied to the complexity of money laundering schemes.125 
This Part addresses the need for clarity in the MLCA that would 
favor balanced application of a limitation period.126  First, this Part 
illustrates the flaws in the MLCA through the Upton decision, focusing 
on its implication that a fact alleged in an indictment can defeat a claim 
that the statute of limitations barred the prosecution.127  This Part then 
elaborates on the Upton decision, as it is one of several decisions that 
attempted to diverge from the strict standard for connecting overt acts 
and conspiratorial agreements that the Supreme Court laid out in 
Grunewald.128  Next, this Part analyzes how alleging tax evasion is 
enough to defeat a limitation period under a loose Grunewald standard.129  
                                                 
123 Id. § 371 (defining a crime of conspiracy as two or more persons intending to defraud 
or commit an offense against the United States). 
124 See SHAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57 (stating that open-ended definitions of the offenses in 
money laundering statutes create a discrepancy that results in an aggressive enforcement 
policy and noting implementation in cases that depart from the sorts of crimes for which 
the statutes were originally intended). 
125 See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 
(2009) (placing the Grunewald direct evidence standard under the scrutiny of the jury and 
considering tax evasion to be an act of concealment if a reasonable jury would find as 
such); Townsend, supra note 119, at 1048–49 (criticizing the Upton decision as diverting 
from the Grunewald standard and addressing the practical implications of determining any 
subsequent failure to file taxes to be an act of concealment in furtherance of a conspiracy). 
126 See infra Part III (analyzing how the interaction between § 1956, § 371, and § 3282 do 
not adequately protect a defendant‘s interest in having the prosecution bring an indictment 
for money laundering within a certain amount of time). 
127 See infra Part III.A (discussing the Upton decision as an indicator that the MLCA is 
vague when applied, as it lacks provisions imposing a limitation period for conspiracy 
charges, thus requiring application of the general limitation period established in § 371 and 
§ 3282). 
128 See infra Part III.B (explaining how the First Circuit and other lower courts have 
interpreted Grunewald loosely by virtue of prosecutors bringing indictments for money 
laundering under § 371, resulting in the risk to defendants of continual exposure to 
indictments). 
129 See infra Part III.C (addressing how including tax evasion as an element of 
concealment in money laundering indictments complicates the relationship between the 
MLCA and the statutes for conspiracy and limitations because tax evasion has its own 
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Finally, this Part discusses alternative methods for applying limitation 
periods, such as statutory rules favoring limitation periods under certain 
circumstances and judicial rules regarding overt acts.130 
A. The Vagueness of the MLCA Risks Overbroad Application of Conspiracy 
and Limitations Statutes 
The First Circuit‘s decision in Upton demonstrates the problem of 
applying a fallback statute of limitations to a money laundering crime.131  
First, the nature of a money laundering conspiracy is unending, 
according to the logic of the Upton decision.132  This logic contrasts with 
                                                                                                             
statute of limitations and proving tax evasion can have a chilling effect on defendants who 
may have sought to minimize tax obligations by legal means). 
130 See infra Part III.D (analyzing state rules favoring either more specific or longer 
limitation periods and judicial consideration of acts in furtherance of a conspiracy as 
alternative methods of applying statutes of limitations in money laundering indictments). 
131 See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 
(2009) (holding that a post-crime act of concealment constituted an act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy, thus precluding the defendant‘s raising of the statute of limitations as an 
affirmative defense).  The dissenting opinion in Upton criticized the majority‘s opinion for 
diverging from the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence of an express original agreement 
standard in Grunewald.  Id. at 17 (Lipez, J., dissenting).  The dissent stated that MLCA‘s 
concealment element does not automatically turn subsequent acts of concealment involving 
financial transactions into conduct within the money laundering conspiracy.  Id. at 19.  The 
dissent advocated a literal interpretation of Grunewald that finds concealment furthers a 
conspiracy only when the prosecution shows direct evidence of an express agreement to 
conceal at the beginning of the conspiracy.  Id.  The dissent also rejected the majority‘s 
reasoning that an act of concealment facilitating the central aim of the conspiracy furthers 
that conspiracy.  Id. at 20.  The dissent criticized the court‘s depiction of the money 
laundering scheme as a § 371 conspiracy, rather than a § 1956(h) conspiracy.  Id. at 22–23.  
Section 1956(h), the conspiracy provision exclusive to the MLCA, lacks an overt act 
requirement, and any act alleged to have furthered the conspiracy would not have been 
considered central to the conspiracy‘s aim under the Grunewald standard.  Id. at 23–24; see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006) (establishing penalties for conspiracy to commit money 
laundering without requiring an overt act to indict).  Thus, the dissent would have ruled 
the money laundering conviction in Upton to be time-barred.  Upton, 559 F.3d. at 24. 
132 See Upton, 559 F.3d at 24 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court‘s ruling that 
the defendant‘s act of tax evasion ten years removed from the end of a money laundering 
scheme concealed that scheme).  The dissent stated that Grunewald supported the 
proposition that viewing concealment efforts as part of a conspiracy by itself ―would ‗wipe 
out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases‘ and ‗result in a great widening of the 
scope of conspiracy prosecutions‘ because ‗every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by 
actions taken to cover the conspirators‘ traces.‘‖  Id. at 17 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402 (1957); see also Townsend, supra note 119, at 
1049 (criticizing the Upton decision as allowing a conspiracy to have an indefinite end 
―depending on the unforeseeable individual acts of conspirators who are no longer 
conspiring‖).  As a result of Upton, prosecutors may allege any subsequent failure to timely 
report proceeds from a specified unlawful activity under the MLCA to be either 
concealment in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy, or a presumption of a 
defendant‘s involvement in a money laundering scheme.  Id.  Despite the Internal Revenue 
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Grunewald, which stood for the proposition that a money laundering 
scheme does end at some fixed point in time.133  Second, the money 
laundering statute is at risk of being overbroad, as its specified unlawful 
activity provision defines countless acts of concealment that may further 
a money laundering scheme.134  In the context of the statute of 
limitations, any act listed in § 1956(c)(7) can defeat a bar to prosecution 
because a prosecutor can claim that a defendant committed an act listed 
in § 1956(c)(7) and allege that the limitation period commenced when the 
defendant committed that act.135  As a result, a defendant will have a 
                                                                                                             
Code‘s requirement to report profits of criminal enterprises without risk of prosecution by 
the government, it is uncommon for money launderers to report and pay taxes on their 
proceeds, which is in effect tax evasion.  Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (making it a 
crime to evade paying taxes by failing to file or falsifying returns).  What results from this 
situation is the ―never-ending conspiracy,‖ as the limitation period will commence upon 
the last overt act, i.e., the failure to file the most recent tax return.  Townsend, supra note 
119, at 1049. 
133 See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401–02 (―[A]llowing such a conspiracy to conceal to be 
inferred or implied from mere overt acts of concealment would result in a great widening 
of the scope of conspiracy prosecutions, since it would extend the life of a conspiracy 
indefinitely.‖).  Of particular concern to the Court in Grunewald was that a finding that acts 
of concealment preclude a time-bar to a prosecution ―would for all practical purposes wipe 
out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases‖ because conspiracies by their nature 
include an element of concealment.  Id. at 402. 
134 See SHAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57 (raising concerns about overly broad money 
laundering statutes such as the MLCA).  Three significant discrepancies exist in the policy 
of the money laundering statutes in § 1956 and § 1957:  (1) the definitions of the offenses 
are open-ended; (2) the source of the funds were the only restriction on a finding of actus 
reus; and (3) the purpose of the actions are all-encompassing.  Id.  These discrepancies 
made it ―safe to say that over-breadth of the definitions has resulted in an incoherent 
enforcement policy,‖ specifically that aggressive enforcement has resulted in cases where 
the statute‘s implementation departs from situations originally intended.  Id. at 57.  
Overbroad application of the money laundering statutes, according to Shams, illustrates 
that: 
These issues are serious in the context of criminal law enforcement in 
that they undermine fundamental legal principles.  For example, the 
principle of legality mandates that there is no crime without a law.  A 
broad legal definition that fails to put those concerned on sufficient 
notice would fail to satisfy the mandates of the principle of legality.  
Further, this extensive prosecutorial discretion would undermine the 
principle of equality before the law:  equal cases will be treated 
unequally. 
Id. 
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (providing an exhaustive list of specified unlawful activities 
qualifying under the activity element, including racketeering, criminal enterprise, and 
enumerated offenses under Title 18). 
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difficult time raising an expired limitation period as an affirmative 
defense to a money laundering prosecution.136 
The tax evasion provision in § 1956 creates a problem in that an act 
of tax evasion, even if it is slightly related to a money laundering 
scheme, may constitute an overt act in furtherance of that scheme.137  As 
the ruling in Upton indicated, tax evasion can constitute an act in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.138  Moreover, there is a concern that courts 
may rule that prosecutors do not need to distinguish between tax 
aversion, which is not a crime, and tax evasion.139  As a result, it will 
become more difficult to maintain the Grunewald direct evidence 
standard if courts allow prosecutors to show no more than a reasonable 
belief that a defendant‘s failure to file taxes was an act in furtherance of 
the original agreement.140  The next Section discusses this expansion of 
the scope of conspiracy.141 
B. Loosening of the Grunewald Direct Evidence Standard Makes the Scope of 
the Conspiracy in Money Laundering Crimes Overbroad 
Grunewald stood for the proposition that courts should not interpret 
acts of concealment following a conspiracy to be within the scope of the 
                                                 
136 See MADINGER, supra note 33, at 48 (stating that the crime of money laundering is 
never really completed because proceeds from unlawful activity never lose their illegal 
nature, implying that money laundering is an unending crime). 
137 See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that a defendant‘s conduct intending ―to engage in 
conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206‖ constitutes money laundering). 
138 United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009). 
139 See United States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (D. Nev. 1989) (rejecting the 
argument that the definition of the word ―avoid‖ in the context of the transaction reporting 
requirement was synonymous with the definition of ―evade‖ as in § 7201 and § 7206).  The 
Kimball court‘s conclusion that aversion and evasion are synonymous has come under 
criticism on the grounds that those words have different meanings in the tax code.  See 
Strafer, supra note 33, at 193 (stating the court in Kimball erred in noting the distinction).  
Strafer elaborates: 
In tax parlance, the terms avoid and evade do have different meanings.  
It is not a crime to avoid paying taxes.  Avoidance only becomes illegal 
evasion when a taxpayer uses means which are themselves prohibited 
by law.  Either the taxpayer files false tax returns concealing the very 
existence of income or he utilizes deductions or tax reporting methods 
which are prohibited by the Internal Revenue Code.  However, where 
the Code or the legality of the taxpayer‘s reporting method is itself 
unclear, he cannot properly be convicted of tax evasion. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
140 See Townsend, supra note 119, at 1049 (echoing the concern of the dissent in Upton that 
the Grunewald standard would not permit ―conflating a mere subsequent act of 
concealment into the original agreement simply because it occurred‖). 
141 See infra Part III.B (asserting that case law modifying the Grunewald standard has 
expanded the scope of conspiracies to a potential limitlessness). 
Marusarz: Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry:  Preserving the Policy Behin
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
290 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
original agreement without evidence of a direct connection between the 
acts and the original agreement.142  Grunewald also stood for the 
proposition that courts should bar an indictment for the conspiracy 
unless there was a direct connection between subsequent acts of 
concealment and the original agreement.143  Upton, however, complicated 
the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald.144  This complication is not 
entirely a recent development, as the direct evidence standard in 
Grunewald has come under criticism for too greatly limiting the 
prosecutor‘s capacity to prove an original agreement.145  The District 
Court for the Northern District of California, for example, modified the 
Grunewald standard on the ground that Grunewald did not do enough.146  
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit avoids Grunewald and instead imposes a 
lesser burden on prosecutors to prove evidence connecting acts of 
concealment within the original agreement.147 
                                                 
142 Aronoff, supra note 61, at 560 (stating that the Court established the direct evidence 
standard in Grunewald to prevent courts from inferring that subsequent acts of concealment 
were within the scope of the original agreement without a showing of a direct connection). 
143 See id. at 562 (stating that the government must prove conspirators agreed to an act of 
concealment in the original, express agreement before the government can use evidence of 
that act to prove the continuation of a conspiracy).  Failure to prove a direct connection 
excludes the act of concealment as alleged in the indictment.  Id. at 553. 
144 See supra notes 131–32 (elaborating on the argument put forth by the dissent in Upton 
that the court misapplied the Grunewald standard). 
145 See Aronoff, supra note 61, at 558 (―Critics of Grunewald have suggested that requiring 
direct evidence of an express conspiratorial agreement to conceal would effectively prevent 
prosecutors from using an ‗express original agreement to conceal‘ approach.‖).  One court 
concluded that any attempt to prevent discovery of an already committed crime does not 
constitute an act in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Green v. U.S. Prob. Office, 504 F. Supp. 
1003, 1005-06 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev‟d, 671 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1981). 
146 Green, 504 F. Supp. at 1005–06 (dismissing parts of an indictment claiming the 
defendant hid information from federal agents in furtherance of a conspiracy because the 
act of concealment occurred after the original crime started to be revealed).  The ruling of 
Green thus suggests that the Court‘s approach in Grunewald did not go far enough in 
limiting what constitutes concealment in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Aronoff, supra note 
61, at 558 n.87.  Thus, the Green decision extends beyond what the dissent in Upton would 
have decided.  Compare United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 21 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 397 (2009) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (―By confining ‗necessary‘ acts of concealment to 
those that occur contemporaneously with the overt acts that comprise the substantive 
crime, the Supreme Court‘s concern in Grunewald—that acts of concealment not be used to 
indefinitely extend the duration of a conspiracy—does not arise.‖), with Green, 504 F. Supp. 
at 1005 (―[L]ater attempts to cover up a crime as it begins to come to light cannot be taken 
to be overt acts that make up the original conspiracy.‖). 
147 United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir. 1966) (stating that acts following 
the completion of a conspiracy that indicate a conspiratorial design can further a 
conspiracy).  Criticism of the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning in Hickey revolved around the fact 
that the court ignored the direct evidence language in Grunewald.  Aronoff, supra note 61, at 
560.  Instead, the court only required that there should be ―evidence that the conspirators 
originally agreed to take certain steps after the principal objective of the conspiracy was 
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Criticism of these rulings raises the concern that courts are 
attempting to diminish the effect of the Grunewald standard.148  Such 
courts attempted to weaken the Grunewald standard by not requiring 
prosecutors to show direct evidence that conspirators agreed in the 
original agreement to commit an act of concealment.149  The courts in 
these cases reasoned that it is appropriate to allow a jury to infer an 
original agreement when a crime, by its nature, has ―no specific 
terminating event‖ and ―provides a substantial inference of agreement to 
conceal or cover-up.‖150  These cases, however, limit the effectiveness of 
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, while simultaneously 
                                                                                                             
reached, or evidence from which such an agreement may reasonably be inferred.‖  Hickey, 
360 F.2d at 141.  This has been interpreted as a loosening of the Grunewald standard, for 
―the ‗ample evidence‘ used by the court to justify its decision was not the ‗direct evidence‘ 
required by Grunewald.‖  Aronoff, supra note 61, at 560. 
148 Id. at 564.  Aronoff remarks on the effect of recent rulings on the Grunewald standard, 
stating that: 
Grunewald was the culmination of the Supreme Court‘s effort to 
balance the dangers of a continuing conspiracy against the dangers of 
improperly using acts of concealment to allege and prove such a 
conspiracy. . . . The deterioration of the direct evidence requirement in 
Hickey and the circumvention of that requirement in Nowak and 
Bonanno exemplify a failure properly to identify acts of concealment 
and result in a failure to maintain the Grunewald balance.  A 
continuation of this trend will pave the way for the ―ominous 
expansion of the accepted law of conspiracy‖ that Krulewitch . . . and 
Grunewald sought to prohibit. 
Id. at 564–65 (footnote omitted). 
149 See United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980) (following Grunewald in 
stating that ―a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial 
evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators 
took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment‖); United 
States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 964 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that evidence of the defendants‘ 
agreement to furnish bail and counsel for one another prior to committing a string of bank 
robberies demonstrated direct evidence of concealment by giving a defendant the incentive 
not to name names and established the defendants‘ intent to continue the conspiracy).  The 
court in Davis held that a defendant‘s declarations about plans to burn down a warehouse 
containing a corporation‘s inventory were an act of concealment in furtherance of a 
conspiracy to declare bankruptcy and defraud creditors.  Davis, 623 F.2d at 192. 
150 United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1978).  Compare id. (involving a 
conspiracy to evade taxes), with Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441 (1949) 
(involving a conspiracy to violate the White Slave Traffic Act).  The court in Mackey stated 
that the basis for distinguishing the Court‘s ruling in Krulewitch was that the crime in 
Krulewitch was a ―discrete criminal act‖ which did not by its nature require substantial 
efforts to conceal.  Mackey, 571 F.2d at 383.  In contrast, the issue before the court in Mackey 
was tax evasion, a crime that by its nature demanded substantial efforts at concealment.  Id.  
In a footnote, the court further elaborated by stating that achieving the goal of a conspiracy 
terminates it.  Id. at 383–84 n.10.  The court implied that there is no single event that 
completes a conspiracy of tax evasion; therefore, a defendant must always work to conceal 
the act.  Id. 
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circumventing the Grunewald standard by easing the burden on 
prosecutors to demonstrate that an act was in furtherance of a 
conspiracy.151 
As an inchoate crime, conspiracy creates a problem of ongoing 
criminal acts which courts have addressed through rulings that defeat 
the criminal limitation period under § 3282.152  Courts have tried to 
resolve this problem and, in doing so, created another danger:  
overriding the statute of limitations without the necessary requisite of 
direct evidence to prove that acts of concealment are overt acts 
furthering the main objectives of conspiracy.153  Neither § 371 nor § 3282 
provides guidance on how to prevent the danger to defendants of 
ongoing exposure to charges and endless opportunities for prosecutors 
to prosecute money laundering crimes.154  An appropriate resolution 
                                                 
151 See Upton, 559 F.3d at 14 (concluding that a post-conspiracy act does not need to meet 
the direct evidence standard in order for a reasonable jury to determine it was an act of 
concealment); Mackey, 571 F.2d at 383 (diverging from the Grunewald standard and stating 
that a conspirator‘s statement is sufficient evidence of a continuing conspiracy because a 
jury ―could infer that an agreement to conceal existed at the outset of the conspiracy‖); 
United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139–40 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that giving false 
statements in order to misapply money from a government savings and loan was not part 
of an original agreement to conceal but constituted concealment because it violated a 
federal anti-concealment statute); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112–13 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev‟d sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(distinguishing Grunewald on the grounds that the defendants violated a federal statute 
criminalizing acts the defendants used to conceal a conspiracy). 
152 See Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. at 112 (discussing the main dangers arising in a conspiracy 
and its effect on the statute of limitations).  The court states: 
The statute of limitations in a criminal case serves not only to bar 
prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but it also serves to 
cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after completion, when 
no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity.  
A continuing conspiracy is a continuing danger.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the statute of limitations runs from the last objective act 
that indicates that the original agreement, and the danger arising 
therefrom, is still alive. . . . [W]hen the end or ends of a conspiracy 
have not been attained, the conspiracy should be considered alive so 
long as the danger of fruition lives.  In such cases it is not that the 
statute of limitations has been extended but that the ends of the 
conspirators were pitched far in advance by their original agreement. 
Id. at 112–13. 
153 Aronoff, supra note 61, at 564–65.  The danger that the weakening of the Grunewald 
standard poses will abrogate the precedent the Supreme Court laid out in cases like 
Krulewitch and Grunewald.  Id. at 565; see also Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 454–55 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (expressing concern that the majority‘s opinion holding co-conspirator 
statements inadmissible as evidence of concealment ―introduced an ominous expansion of 
the accepted law of conspiracy‖). 
154 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (stating only that conspiracy to defraud or commit an 
offense against the United States is a crime without including any definitions of the 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/9
2010] Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry 293 
must emphasize the distinction between acts done pursuant to a 
conspiratorial agreement and receipt of benefits as a result of such 
acts.155  This solution must also recognize that not all money laundering 
schemes function as enterprises because conspirators may agree to form 
a scheme without agreeing to any consequence of the scheme long after 
they meet their objectives.156  This problem becomes more apparent 
when tax evasion is alleged as an act of concealment, which the next 
Section analyzes.157 
C. Alleging Tax Evasion as an Act of Concealment in a Money Laundering 
Indictment Creates Tension Between the MLCA and Applied Statutes 
Although tax evasion is one example of an act of concealment that 
can be used to further a money laundering scheme, Upton illustrates how 
the tax evasion provision of § 1956, coupled with a liberal interpretation 
of the Grunewald direct evidence standard, can circumvent a limitation 
period.158  This complication first arises when defendants attempt to 
disguise an act of tax evasion as tax minimization, which makes it 
difficult to determine whether the defendant was concealing proceeds in 
furtherance of a conspiracy or reducing his tax liability.159  Courts must 
determine whether a reduction of tax liability was evasion or 
minimization because the latter cannot be direct evidence of an express 
                                                                                                             
elements of conspiracy); id. § 3282 (providing that non-capital offenses are subject to a five-
year limitation period without any provisions prescribing when such periods commence 
and applying generally as a fallback provision absent other applicable statutes of 
limitations for certain crimes). 
155 Cf. Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 192–94 (stating that antitrust conspiracies serve a 
purpose to restrain trade and not just for unjust enrichment of the conspirators). 
156 Cf. Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2189–90 (arguing that because RICO prosecutions 
lack an overt act requirement, determining when an individual conspirator abandoned the 
conspiracy is the appropriate approach for commencing a limitations period in RICO 
prosecutions). 
157 See infra Part III.C (discussing the significance that alleging tax evasion as an act of 
concealment has on the tension between the MLCA and § 3282). 
158 See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 10–15 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 
(2009) (evaluating the defendant‘s claim that the indictment did not defeat the statute of 
limitations and rejecting his argument that an act of tax evasion was not an act of 
concealment in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy); see also supra note 76 
(introducing the facts of the Upton case and the First Circuit‘s reasoning behind its 
decision). 
159 COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 58, at 65.  Even in the context of 
international money laundering prevention, the personal mentality of reducing one‘s own 
tax liability when possible cannot go unnoticed.  Id.  This complicates the distinction 
between tax evasion, an illegal practice, and tax minimization, a legal practice, as 
intentional reduction of tax liability approaches tax evasion.  Id. 
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original agreement to conceal proceeds of a money laundering scheme.160  
Courts also consider the defendant‘s motivation or intent to evade taxes 
as significant in determining the existence of an affirmative act; indeed, 
several courts prefer to let juries make inferences about evidence of an 
affirmative act of evasion instead of expecting absolute evidence of an 
affirmative act.161 
Although Upton is a case of first impression within the First Circuit, 
its ruling is similar to the rulings of other circuits that have concluded 
that conspiracies involving acts of tax evasion present an endless danger 
because the opportunity to bar a prosecution may never arise.162  It is 
possible, however, to distinguish these cases based on whether the 
relationship between tax evasion and the goal of the conspiracy is 
significant.163  Alternatively, if these cases should be thought of as related 
because of the presence of tax evasion, regardless of its purpose in a 
conspiracy, then there is a question as to whether the § 6531 statute of 
limitations should apply instead of the more general § 3282.164  Part III.D 
discusses such alternative methods.165 
D. Alternative Methods of Considering the Statute of Limitations Can 
Accommodate the Complexity of Money Laundering Schemes 
There are two ways of approaching the complexity of money 
laundering schemes through state common law rules about limitation 
periods.166  First, state rules can favor certain statutes of limitations, 
                                                 
160 See id. (stating that the line between legal tax minimization and illegal tax evasion is a 
fine one). 
161 See Gomez & Schomig, supra note 69, at 1038 (stating that some courts have rejected 
the affirmative act requirement and have concluded instead that a jury may infer from the 
evidence that a defendant committed such acts willfully). 
162 See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13–14 (concluding that a reasonable jury could infer that the 
defendant‘s false tax returns for two years were part of an ongoing plan to conceal a money 
laundering scheme); United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding 
that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants concealed information from an 
investigation to further the main objective of a conspiracy to commit tax evasion). 
163 Compare Upton, 559 F.3d at 6–7 (involving an act of tax evasion that defendants 
allegedly intended to use to conceal proceeds in a complicated money laundering scheme), 
with Mackey, 571 F.2d at 379–81 (involving an act of tax evasion that defendants allegedly 
intended to serve as the main goal of the conspiracy). 
164 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (establishing a five-year limitation period to apply to 
non-capital offenses unless provided by another statute), with 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006) 
(establishing a three-year limitation period for tax offenses, with an exception for tax 
evasion that has a six-year limitation period). 
165 See infra Part III.D (discussing the insight state rules and judicial approaches to the 
overt acts in confronting complex money laundering schemes). 
166 See infra Part III.D (discussing state rules favoring statutes of limitations that are more 
specific or provide longer limitation periods and then discussing case law on the first and 
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which raises the question of whether federal application of these rules 
will serve to balance the policy of a limitation period to benefit a 
defendant in an indictment for money laundering.167  In particular, this 
section analyzes whether application of state rules favoring limitation 
periods will allow the use of § 6531 as an affirmative defense.168  Second, 
this section will discuss how courts apply the first and last overt act 
rules, two theories that try to resolve the question of when the statute of 
limitations should commence in a conspiracy.169  Section 3282, however, 
does not have an overt act requirement, leaving courts to make the 
difficult evaluation of what is an act in furtherance of a conspiracy.170 
1. State Rules Favoring Certain Statutes of Limitations 
State statutory construction principles provide insight into the 
question of which statute of limitations applies in a money laundering 
indictment.171  Federal courts have yet to adopt either the rule favoring 
the longer limitation period or the rule favoring the most specific cause 
of action in cases under federal law.172  Application of the rule favoring 
the longer limitation period may serve to give the prosecutor a longer 
period of time in which to bring an indictment, assuming that the 
allegations in the indictment are reasonable.173  If, for example, a 
                                                                                                             
last overt act rules, which determine both the scope of the conspiracy and the point at 
which the limitation period commences). 
167 See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the rules state courts have used to determine the most 
appropriate statute of limitations to apply to an indictment, depending on if the courts 
favor the longer limitation period or the most specific statute of limitations for a cause of 
action). 
168 See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing whether the § 3282 limitation 
period applies to tax evasion conspiracies when viewed under state law principles in 
applying limitation periods). 
169 See infra notes 182–87 and accompanying text (introducing the first and last overt act 
rules as attempts by courts to resolve the issue of when limitation periods commence 
without guidance from the controlling conspiracy statute). 
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (providing only that non-capital offenses are given a five-
year limitation period, but not addressing what would constitute commencement). 
171 See supra note 91 (listing state court rulings favoring statutes of limitations that either 
provide the longest limitation period or correlate with the most specific cause of action). 
172 See Wallace v. Hardee‘s of Oxford, 874 F. Supp. 374, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (rejecting 
defendant‘s argument that absence of an applicable limitation period in a cause of action 
required the court to apply the most applicable federal statute of limitations because there 
was no case law or authorization from Congress supporting the borrowing of a limitation 
period). 
173 Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006) (applying a six-year limitation period when 
applicable), with 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (applying a five-year limitation period as a fallback 
provision).  Some courts applied the longer limitation period rule on the grounds that a 
litigant bringing a claim to court has a valid claim and should be allowed an opportunity to 
litigate it.  See McDowell v. Alaska, 957 P.2d 965, 971 (Alaska 1998) (stating that the court 
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prosecutor alleges that a defendant committed tax evasion to conceal 
proceeds, then application of § 6531 would extend the limitation period 
to six years instead of the shorter five-year period under § 3282.174  This 
extends the amount of time the prosecution has to bring an indictment, 
but it also gives the prosecution an opportunity to decide whether to 
pursue an indictment for conspiracy to commit money laundering 
against the defendant.175 
Similarly, the rule favoring the most specific cause of action gives 
notice to the defendant of what limitation period applies when any one 
act violates another statute.176  Although § 3282 is a fallback statute, 
courts have ruled that in the case of a conspiracy involving tax evasion, 
the limitation period is five years rather than six years as provided in 
§ 6531 for tax evasion indictments.177  This pattern suggests that in a 
money laundering conspiracy where the defendants are alleged to have 
committed tax evasion to conceal the proceeds of the scheme, § 3282 
applies instead of § 6531 despite the former‘s exception provision.178  
                                                                                                             
will prefer a longer limitation period because use of a time-bar as a defense is discouraged); 
Guertin v. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (limiting application of the 
longer limitation period rule to indictments that have reasonable allegations); Amco Ins. 
Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. 1997) (favoring the longer limitation 
period because a claim is presumptively valid). 
174 See 26 U.S.C. § 6531(1) (stating that a conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws 
commences a six-year limitation period); 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (stating that any non-capital 
offense not provided for in another statute commences a five-year limitation period). 
175 Cf. DEP‘T OF FIN. CAN., supra note 84, § 6.15 (advising an extension of the statute of 
limitations for convicting non-compliance violations).  Extending the Canadian statute of 
limitations for purposes of the money laundering regime provides greater flexibility to 
prosecutors in determining whether to prosecute.  Id. 
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (providing a generally applicable limitation period for non-capital 
offenses); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (providing a limitation period for tax offenses only); see also 
Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Neb. 1999) (preferring a statute of 
limitations for a specific statutory cause of action over a more general one because the more 
specific limitation period reflects the legislature‘s express will in direct relation to the 
specific cause of action); Thomas Steel, Inc. v. Wilson Bennett, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the court will determine the proper limitation period 
based on whether the defendant committed an act in violation of a statutory provision 
relating to the subject matter of that cause of action). 
177 See United States v. Ely, 140 F.3d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing defendant‘s 
claim that an indictment against him for a tax violation was time-barred because § 3282 
applies to a conspiracy indictment under § 371 unless another statute provides otherwise). 
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (providing that a five-year limitation period will apply unless a 
limitation period is authorized by another statute); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 
391, 396 n.8 (1957) (stating that § 3282 governed in an indictment for a conspiracy to evade 
taxes to defraud the United States without stating its reason for applying § 3282 instead of 
§ 6531); Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (holding that § 3282 applied in defendant‘s claim because the 
prosecutors brought the indictment under § 371, and the tax offense was not applicable to 
defendant because he did not satisfy an element of that offense). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/9
2010] Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry 297 
This is bolstered by the fact that courts have applied the § 3282 limitation 
period in such instances.179  Furthermore, because courts are split on 
whether § 6531 or § 3282 applies, the claim that the Supreme Court 
settled the matter based on § 371‘s lack of a provision granting a 
limitation period is questionable.180  Proper application of these rules, 
either by courts or as amendments to the MLCA, would therefore also 
require evaluating § 371‘s relationship with the MLCA; namely, whether 
the prosecutor properly defined the cause of action against the defendant 
as either conspiracy or money laundering in the indictment.181 
2. Judicial Approaches to the Overt Act Requirement 
Alternatively, judicial approaches to the overt act requirement give 
guidance on how to address the problem of concealment in the MLCA.182  
The dominant rule defining when the limitation period commences 
states that commencement begins upon the last overt act, which the 
Supreme Court in Grunewald limited to the main objective of the 
conspiracy.183  There has been precedent in support of the principle that 
the limitation period should commence upon the first overt act if the 
                                                 
179 See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009) 
(stating that § 3282 applies for violations of the money laundering statute and that the 
indictment was for conspiracy to commit money laundering). 
180 See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 396 n.8 (stating that a conspiracy under § 371 requires 
§ 3282 because the conspiracy statute does not have its own time-bar provision).  Compare 
Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (holding that defendants‘ conspiracy to disclose tax return information 
in violation of federal statute invoked the general limitation period), with United States v. 
Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974) (ruling that defendant‘s conspiracy to commit tax 
evasion in violation of § 7201 was not barred because Grunewald did not mandate that the 
§ 3282 limitation period is required in conspiracy charges involving tax offenses). 
181 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the MLCA that will reconcile the gaps in 
the application of conspiracy, money laundering, and limitations statutes, which leave a 
money laundering conspiracy unending, and that will tip the balance of the policy interests 
related to statutes of limitations back to equalize the interests of defendants and 
prosecutors). 
182 See infra notes 183–87 and accompanying text (discussing judicial approaches toward 
applying the overt act requirement to the issue of when a limitation period commences). 
183 See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (stating that when the conspiracy 
statute requires existence of an overt act, the last overt act commences the limitation 
period); see also Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401–02 (declining to extend the last overt act rule to 
acts of concealment intended to cover up the conspirators‘ involvement because all 
conspiracies have some act of concealment included, and to extend the rule would defeat 
the purpose of the statute of limitations); Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2175 (discussing the 
last overt act rule and the implications it has on what the prosecution must prove to defeat 
a defense of the statute of limitations).  Courts have generally accepted the last overt act 
rule because it balances the defendant‘s interest in the application of a uniform statute of 
limitations and the prosecutor‘s interest in not needing to bring several charges of 
conspiracy.  Id. 
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applicable statute defines the conspiracy as having two provisions:  (1) 
an agreement and (2) the act completing the conspiracy.184  The first 
overt act rule received little support from the courts but stood for the 
proposition that a conspiracy must end at some point in time.185  Courts 
have dismissed this rule as a matter of policy asserting that it too heavily 
favors the defendant‘s interest in uniform application of the statute of 
limitations at the expense of reducing administrative waste.186  Despite 
the last overt act rule‘s popularity among courts, the Supreme Court in 
Grunewald appeared to recognize the policy behind the first overt act rule 
that the language of the federal conspiracy statute requires a conspiracy 
to end at some point, regardless of its nature.187 
In summary, the First Circuit decision in Upton illustrates a 
misapplication of the Grunewald direct evidence standard that otherwise 
raises the burden of proof required to show that a post-conspiracy act of 
concealment was in furtherance of the original conspiracy.188  Upton also 
illustrates the problems with relying on fallback provisions absent in the 
MLCA.189  Congress recognized the complexity of money laundering 
conspiracies by drafting the MLCA to include a wide variety of specified 
unlawful activities and transactions that conceal the illegal nature of 
                                                 
184 See United States v. Owen, 32 F. 534, 538 (D. Or. 1887) (rejecting the prosecution‘s 
argument that the limitation period commences upon the last overt act of a conspiracy 
because the statute at issue did not define a conspiracy as having acts in furtherance of a 
conspiracy). 
185 See Ex parte Black, 147 F. 832, 841 (E.D. Wis. 1906) (stating that a new overt act after the 
completion of a conspiracy begins a new conspiracy). 
186 See Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2175 (stating that courts prefer the last overt act rule 
over the first overt act rule because the prosecution can avoid administrative waste by not 
having to bring new indictments for conspiracy).  Jancko-Baken adds that in conspiracy 
statutes that lack an overt act requirement there is no method or formula for determining 
when an overt act time-bars an indictment.  Id. at 2176.  When there is no overt act 
requirement in the statute, courts should look for evidence of an agreement because the 
agreement ―remain[s] the essence of a successful conspiracy charge where proof of an overt 
act is not required.‖  Id. 
187 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (allowing an indictment for conspiracy if it alleges the 
defendant did ―any act to effect the object of the conspiracy‖); see also Law of May 17, 1879, 
ch. 5440, 21 Stat. 4 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)) (making a defendant liable for 
conspiracy if he committed any act to effect the object of the conspiracy); Grunewald, 353 
U.S. at 404 (requiring direct evidence that shows conspirators agreed to conceal the 
conspiracy after completing its main objectives).  The Court refused to adopt ―the 
proposition that the duration of a conspiracy can be indefinitely lengthened merely because 
the conspiracy is kept a secret, and merely because the conspirators take steps to bury their 
traces.‖  Id. at 405. 
188 See supra Part III (comparing Upton and Grunewald). 
189 See supra Part III.B (discussing Upton and other cases that have diverged from the 
Grunewald direct evidence standard). 
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funds derived from criminal activity, including tax evasion.190  The 
MLCA, however, remains incomplete, and more specific provisions in 
§ 1956 and § 1957 stating the conditions for a conspiracy indictment 
could reconcile the complexity of money laundering schemes and the 
interests in preserving effective statutes of limitations for such crimes.191 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
As shown above, judicial attempts to interpret the MLCA abrogated 
the principle that a limitation period should be balanced in favor of the 
defendant when enough time has passed to make evidence difficult to 
obtain.192  A legislative solution modifying the MLCA and applicable 
statutes can give certainty to defendants expecting possible indictments 
for money laundering conspiracies.193  A legislative solution can also 
maintain the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence standard from 
Grunewald.194   
This Part proposes amendments to the MLCA and applicable 
statutes to effectuate the policies of limitation periods and reduce the 
danger of stale money laundering claims being brought against 
defendants.195  First, Part IV.A discusses a proposed limitations provision 
for § 1956 that will apply the policy that statutes of limitations protect 
defendants from stale claims to money laundering indictments.196  Part 
IV.B then proposes an amendment to § 1956 that codifies the Grunewald 
direct evidence standard and settles confusion in the lower courts as to 
the scope of the Grunewald standard.197  Finally, Part IV.C sets out a 
                                                 
190 See generally § 1956(c)(7) (listing several activities and crimes that Congress defined as 
specified unlawful activities for purposes of establishing that element in a money 
laundering prosecution). 
191 See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA that provide a limitation 
period for money laundering crimes in addition to conspiracy provisions, which relate to 
money laundering). 
192 See supra Part III (analyzing how courts and the MLCA permitted the time limit to 
indict money laundering conspiracies to extend to a point where defendants are in 
continual danger of prosecution long beyond the completion of the conspiracy). 
193 See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA, including limitation 
and conspiracy provisions specific to money laundering crimes within § 1956, as well as 
amendments to § 371 and § 3282 that exclude their application in § 1956 indictments). 
194 See supra Parts III.A–C (discussing how courts‘ interpretations of the Grunewald 
standard abrogated the principle that a conspiracy must end to maintain the purpose of the 
limitation period asserted by the Supreme Court); see also infra Part IV.B (proposing a 
model amendment to § 1956 codifying the Grunewald standard). 
195 See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA, § 371, and §3282). 
196 See infra Part IV.A (amending § 1956 to include a limitations provision separate from 
the general limitations provision under § 3282). 
197 See infra Part IV.B (defining the direct evidence standard that the Supreme Court 
established in Grunewald for purposes of § 1956); see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 
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model conspiracy provision for purposes of § 1956 that prevents 
prosecution of money laundering conspiracies under § 371 and therefore 
precludes application of the general limitation period under § 3282.198  
The amendments proposed below conserve the policy of a limitation 
period as a legislative instrument, in addition to limiting the scope of 
proving a conspiracy under Grunewald.199 
A. Amending § 1956 with a Limitations Provision Recognizes Complex 
Money Laundering Schemes 
Section 3282 excludes non-capital offenses from the general 
limitation period if a statute explicitly requires a specific limitation 
period.200  As discussed above, prosecutors routinely use § 3282‘s general 
limitation period when they bring indictments for money laundering.201  
Prosecutors also justify application of § 3282 by alleging that money 
launderers committed conspiracy under § 371, the general conspiracy 
statute.202 
Thus, Congress should amend § 1956 to include a limitations 
provision that the statute lacks.203  This provision will be labeled 
subsection (j) and should state: 
                                                                                                             
U.S. 391, 404 (1957) (stating that evidence must support a direct connection between an act 
of concealment that occurred after the objectives of the conspiracy were met and the 
original agreement to conceal funds in a money laundering scheme). 
198 See infra Part IV.C (proposing an amendment to § 1956 that replaces conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, which requires amending § 371, with an exclusionary clause 
that prevents prosecutors from bringing indictments for money laundering under a 
conspiracy claim). 
199 See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 413–14 (providing a standard requiring juries to infer that 
an act of concealment was part of the original agreement when there is direct evidence 
suggesting that inference); supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Grunewald that attempted to limit the scope of alleging a conspiracy to launder money for 
purposes of applying a limitation period, and cases succeeding Grunewald that diminished 
the effect of the Supreme Court‘s interest in limiting the scope of conspiracy for purposes of 
the statutes of limitations); see also supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (stating that 
federal courts have shown deference to Congress‘s policies behind limitation periods). 
200 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006). 
201 See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (discussing how the MLCA lacks a 
conspiracy provision, thus prosecutors include § 371 when bringing an indictment for 
money laundering conspiracies, resulting in application of § 3282 as a fallback limitation 
period). 
202 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (stating that § 3282 is a fallback 
limitation period for non-capital offenses that is also brought in under § 371). 
203 See supra notes 120–25 (discussing the absence of a limitations provision in § 1956, 
which results in money laundering crimes being indicted under § 371 and the 
consequential danger of the unending conspiracy). 
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(j) Limitation period—a prosecution for an offense under this 
section must be brought within five (5) years from the date of 
the last overt act committed in furtherance of a money 
laundering offense.  A prosecution for an offense under this 
section, including an indictment for tax evasion under 
sections 7201 and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code, must be 
brought under the limitation period provided in section 6531 
paragraphs (5) and (8) of the Internal Revenue Code.204 
This provision will exclude money laundering offenses from the 
general limitation period under § 3282 because it is a limitations 
provision sensitive to money laundering indictments.205  This will 
prevent defendants from being subjected to the five-year limitation 
period in § 3282 and will leave the option to apply the limitation period 
in the model amendment to § 1956 or the six-year limitation period in 
§ 6531.206  Section 6531‘s limitation period may be more appropriate in an 
indictment alleging tax evasion by virtue of rules favoring the more 
specific and longer limitation period.207 
B. Amending § 1956 with a Definition of Direct Evidence That Maintains a 
Consistent Interpretation of the Grunewald Standard 
The Grunewald standard requires evidence that directly connects an 
act of concealment after the conclusion of a money laundering 
conspiracy and the original agreement to conceal.208  As discussed in Part 
III, however, lower courts have inconsistently applied this standard.209  
Amendments to § 1956 are necessary to avoid future inconsistent 
                                                 
204 The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
205 See § 3282 (excluding statutes already containing limitation periods from the general 
five-year period). 
206 See id. § 3282 (providing a five-year limitation period for non-capital offenses under 
federal law unless a specific statute establishes its own limitation period); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 
(2006) (subjecting acts of tax evasion to a six-year limitation period); supra note 204 
(proposing a standard limitation period for indictments brought under § 1956); supra notes 
166–187 and accompanying text (analyzing rules determining when limitation periods 
commence and judicial approaches to the overt act requirement). 
207 See supra Part III.D.1 (analyzing state rules favoring application of the longer and 
more specific limitation period as alternative methods for applying a limitation period to a 
money laundering indictment). 
208 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 413–14 (1957) (stating that a jury can 
only infer that an act of tax evasion was intended to cover up a crime unless evidence 
allows an inference that tax evasion was part of an original agreement to conceal funds 
derived from illegal activity). 
209 See supra Part III.B (describing how some lower courts have either expanded or 
limited the scope of the Grunewald standard with regard to post-conspiracy acts of 
concealment and the original agreements to conceal). 
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interpretations of this standard by lower courts.210  Thus, Congress 
should amend § 1956 with the following provision and label it paragraph 
(1) of subsection (j): 
(1)  “Money laundering offense” for purposes of this section is 
as defined in subsection (a) and subsection (c).211 
This provision retains the existing definition of a money laundering 
offense because it is not necessary to redefine money laundering for the 
purpose of a limitation period.212  Another provision to subsection (j) will 
codify the Grunewald direct evidence standard.213  Thus, paragraph (2) of 
subsection (j) should read: 
(2) “Last overt act” for purposes of this subsection is an act of 
concealment of funds derived from specified unlawful 
activities, as listed in subsection (c), provable by direct 
evidence to have been a part of the original agreement.  
“Original agreement” for purposes of this subsection is 
an agreement between two or more persons to conspire to 
conceal funds derived from specified unlawful activities 
prior to beginning the conspiratorial acts.  “Direct 
evidence” for purposes of this subsection is evidence that 
two or more persons agreed to conceal funds derived from 
unlawful activities specified in subsection (c), and to 
commit overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.214 
The definition of direct evidence in this paragraph reflects the 
Supreme Court‘s conclusion in Grunewald that a jury would not find 
evidence of a connection between the original agreement and a post-
conspiratorial act of concealment if a conspirator did not intend for the 
                                                 
210 See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 415 (stating that based on the direct evidence standard, the 
trial judge must instruct the jury that it may infer an act of concealment as furthering a 
conspiracy if it finds that the central conspiratorial aim was to commit and conceal their 
objectives, in order to protect conspirators from prosecution, and that the acts of 
concealment proved at trial were a part of this aim); supra Part III.B (discussing how lower 
courts diverged from the Supreme Court‘s strict standard by interpreting the direct 
evidence standard differently). 
211 The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
212 See supra note 26 (providing the language of § 1956(a)(1), which defines money 
laundering as an offense); see also supra note 29 (referring to § 1956(c), which defines the 
terms Congress used in establishing the elements of money laundering). 
213 See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald, which 
attempted to limit the scope of conspiracy prosecutions for money laundering crimes, and 
the application of that standard by lower federal courts). 
214 The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
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alleged act of concealment to further the goals agreed to at the outset of 
the conspiracy.215  This will prevent courts from inferring that 
subsequent acts of concealment are within the original agreement of the 
conspiracy to conceal funds and, thus, preclude circumvention of the 
applicable statute of limitations in a money laundering prosecution.216  
This amendment to § 1956 best confronts money laundering conspiracies 
with respect to the Grunewald standard because it recognizes the 
particular nature of money laundering schemes in comparison with 
other continuing conspiracy crimes.217  A conspiracy provision within 
§ 1956, however, is still needed to prevent the use of the general 
conspiracy statute.218 
C. Amending § 1956 with a Conspiracy Provision That Excludes Money 
Laundering Prosecutions from § 371 Indictments and Precludes Applying 
the General Limitation Period Under § 3282 
As discussed in Part III, prosecutors rely on § 371 to bring an 
indictment for a money laundering scheme.219  An amendment to § 371 
excluding its application to an indictment under the MLCA will prevent 
prosecutors from coupling an indictment with this statute, thus 
preventing application of the § 3282 limitation period.220  An amendment 
to the MLCA with its own conspiracy provision parallel to the § 371 
amendment retains that statute‘s effect for purposes of a money 
laundering indictment and also rejects the premise that a money 
laundering scheme is a general conspiracy that is subject to the § 3282 
limitation period.221 
                                                 
215 See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 411 (dismissing the Second Circuit‘s conclusion that the jury 
could infer from the evidence that there was a direct connection between the original 
agreement to conceal and an alleged act of concealment after the conspiracy‘s objectives 
ended); supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (analyzing courts‘ interpretations of the 
overt act rules in applying a limitation period in a conspiracy indictment). 
216 See supra Part III.B (addressing the lower courts‘ inconsistency in applying the 
Grunewald standard). 
217 See supra Part III.B (analyzing the Grunewald direct evidence standard and the limits it 
imposed on alleging acts in furtherance of a conspiracy). 
218 See infra Part IV.C (proposing an amendment to § 1956 making money laundering 
conspiracy prosecutions exclusive to the MLCA and preventing application of § 371 in such 
prosecutions). 
219 See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (stating that prosecutions for money 
laundering fall under § 371, thus the limitation period under § 3282 applies because the 
MLCA lacks a limitations provision). 
220 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutors could 
include § 371 in an indictment for money laundering conspiracies to allow application of 
the fallback five-year limitation period under § 3282). 
221 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006) (providing that the penalty for conspiring to commit 
money laundering is determined by the offense that substantiates the object of the 
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Section 371 will read as follows: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit 
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the 
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or 
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both.  This Section will not apply to 
prosecutions for conspiracy under sections 1956 and 1957 
elsewhere in this title.222 
An amendment to § 1956(h) is needed to preserve the opportunity to 
prosecute for conspiracy but without the added risk of applying the 
general statute of limitations: 
Any person who conspires to commit any offense 
defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the 
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.  
Such an offense will be subject to the limitation period 
provided in subsection (j).223 
This amendment is parallel to the above amendment to § 371 and 
precludes conspiracy indictments under that statute.224  This model 
amendment to § 371 prevents money laundering indictments from being 
subject to the general limitation period under § 3282.225  Instead, this 
amendment subjects the indictments to the particular language of 
§ 1956‘s model limitations provision.226  This will give effect to § 1956(h) 
as a conspiracy provision for money laundering schemes, recognizing 
                                                                                                             
conspiracy); supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (stating that § 1956 lacks a 
conspiracy provision that includes a specific limitation period to a money laundering 
indictment). 
222 § 371 (amendment proposed by author italicized). 
223 Id. § 1956(h) (amendment proposed by author italicized). 
224 See supra note 222 (providing an amendment to § 371 that excludes prosecutions for 
money laundering conspiracies and does not subject money laundering schemes to the 
general statute of limitations under § 3282). 
225 See supra note 204 (providing a model amendment to § 1956 instituting a limitation 
period particular to money laundering indictments). 
226 See supra note 204 (specifying the language that § 1956 needs to provide prosecutors 
with a limitation period for money laundering schemes). 
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that such schemes do not always qualify as traditional conspiracies that 
fall under the general conspiracy statute.227 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since its passage in 1986, the MLCA has implemented Congress‘s 
interest in preventing financial transactions that conceal funds derived 
from illegal activities.  The Act‘s 1988 amendment gave it even broader 
powers to prosecute transactions that conceal funds through tax evasion.  
The broad reach Congress gave to prosecutors to indict alleged money 
laundering schemes raises issues stemming from reliance on other 
criminal statutes for effect.  Specifically, prosecutors rely in their 
indictments on § 371, which criminalizes conspiracy against the United 
States, and § 3282, which establishes a limitation period for non-capital 
offenses, both of which generally apply and leave interpretation of their 
general language to the courts.  What results is the unresolved issue of 
when limitation periods commence in a money laundering indictment 
and the related question of when limitation periods expire.  Given the 
sometimes complex nature of money laundering schemes and the vague 
language of the applicable statutes, the answer for purposes of the 
MLCA may be ―never.‖ 
The legislative solution proposed in Part IV brings the MLCA closer 
to the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Grunewald that evidence of an overt 
act in furtherance of a conspiracy must make a direct connection 
between the act of concealing funds derived from illegal activities and 
the original agreement to conceal.  As the First Circuit evinces in Upton, 
courts have diverged from the Grunewald standard, which implied that a 
conspiracy ends at some point in time, and instead, have suggested that 
§ 371 allows the prosecution to circumvent the limitation period.  The 
proposed amendment to the MLCA will preserve the policy that 
defendants should be protected from claims for acts that time makes too 
difficult to prove.  The amendments will also reaffirm the Supreme 
Court‘s position in Grunewald that, unless the conspirators agreed to 
continue the conspiracy indefinitely, a money laundering scheme must 
have a definite end from which a limitation period can commence. 
David Marusarz 
                                                 
227 See supra note 155 (noting how money laundering conspiracies, like antitrust 
conspiracies, may not be traditional conspiracies when the conspirators‘ intent was not to 
receive the benefits of their conspiracy but to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy). 
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